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SIN, SCANDAL, AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
PROCESS: PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND 
PENNOYER RECONSIDERED 
Wendy Collins Perdue* 
"Confusion now hath made its masterpiece," 1 exclaims Macduff in Act 
II of Macbeth. The same might be said of the venerable case, Pennoyer v. 
Neff.2 Over 100 years after issuing Pennoyer the Supreme Court is still 
laboring to articulate a coherent doctrine of personal jurisdiction within the 
framework established by that opinion. Recently, the Court has become 
particularly interested in personal jurisdiction and has dealt with the issue 
seven times in the last four years. 3 Yet despite this growing body of case 
law, the doctrinal underpinnings remain elusive. The Court continues to 
treat geographic boundaries as central to the interests protected by personal 
jurisdiction, but has never satisfactorily explained why they are so central 
or what interest the doctrine of personal jurisdiction is intended to protect. 
The Court's recent attempts at clarification starkly pose the core issue of 
personal jurisdiction. The Court has observed that "[t]he personal jurisdic-
tion requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest, "4 
but has never explained what liberty interest is at stake. This article 
explores some of the possible theories of what individual or collective 
interests the personal jurisdiction doctrine protects. 
As part of the attempt to understand modern doctrine, this article first 
reexamines Pennoyer v. Neff. This reexamination goes beyond the Supreme 
Court opinion and looks both at the underlying story of the case and the lower 
court opinion. The story of Pennoyer v. N effis of considerable interest in and 
of itself. The cast of characters includes a bigamous United States Senator 
who was elected under an alias, a governor of Oregon who used his inaugura-
tion as a platform to decry his loss in the case, and an illiterate but litigious 
*Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Richard Chused, 
Vicki Jackson, David Perdue, Gerry Spann, and Wendy Williams for their valuable suggestions, and to 
my research assistants Sally Paxton and Larry Stoller. 
1. W. Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act ll, scene iii, 1.72. 
2. 95 u.s. 714 (1877). 
3. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985); Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); 
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie de 
Bauxites des Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982). 
4. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702. 
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settler. In addition, the lower court opinion, all but ignored in most discus-
sions of the case, merits closer attention than it has received. The contrast 
between the lower court's narrow approach to the issues, and the Supreme 
Court's far more expansive opinion, highlights the extraordinary nature of 
Justice Field's opinion. Field, the "prophet" of substantive due process, 
seized on Pennoyer as a vehicle to entrench the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment as a barrier to state action inconsistent with natural 
law rights, and went far beyond the facts and issues before him to do so. 
Field's approach to personal jurisdiction continues to dominate modern 
personal jurisdiction doctrine. His opinion in Pennoyer not only laid the 
foundation for treating personal jurisdiction as a substantive liberty inter-
est, but also established that geographic boundaries are central in the 
protection of that interest. The final section of the article is devoted to an 
examination of these surviving elements of Pennoyer. 
I. THE UNDERLYING STORY5 
As students of civil procedure will recall, 6 Pennoyer v. Neff involved a 
collateral attack on a prior default judgment. In the initial suit, one J.H. 
Mitchell sued Neff in Oregon state court. Because Neff could not be found 
within Oregon, he was served by publication. Neff never appeared and a 
default judgment was entered against him. To satisfy the judgment, Mitchell 
attached Neff's Oregon real estate. The property was sold at auction and 
Penn oyer later acquired it. Nearly a decade later, Neff returned to Oregon 
and brought suit in federal court to evict Pennoyer from the land, claiming 
that the original judgment was invalid. The Supreme Court found for Neff in 
an opinion that has become a cornerstone of personal jurisdiction doctrine. 
These well known facts about the case don't begin to tell the full story. 
The rich underlying tale is worth exploring not only to satisfy the curiousity 
of "Pennoyer cultists, " 7 but also because, as John Noonan has observed, 
"Facts which cannot be shown to be crucial to the disposition of a case are 
important in grasping how person affected person . . . . Even details 
5. Any attempt to recreate the circumstances surrounding events that occurred over 100 years ago is 
fraught with obvious difficulties. Establishing the facts about events in which J.H. Mitchell was 
involved is particularly difficult because, as one research librarian commented, "Mitchell was the kind 
of person who ended his correspondence with bum this letter after reading." The story described here 
has been pieced together from a variety of sources and there are inevitable gaps. Recognizing the risks 
of doing so, I have filled in some of these gaps with hypotheses or speculation, though I have attempted 
to indicate where I have done so. 
6. See Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N. Y.U. L. REv. 33, 33-34 (1978) 
(recounting the extraordinary memory of the case by one student). 
7. !d. at 44 n.53. 
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which are purely extrinsic to any participant in the process have an effect on 
the understanding of the case. "8 
Our story begins with a young man, Marcus Neff, heading across the 
country by covered wagon train, presumably to seek his fortune. Neff left 
Iowa in early 1848 at the age of24, 9 joining a wagon train of five companies 
of wagons. 10 At that time, the question of Oregon statehood was being 
considered in Congress, and there was much speculation that large tracts of 
the vast, undeveloped land of Oregon would be made available to home-
steaders. II The speculation proved to be correct and Marcus Neff was one 
of the earliest settlers to claim land under the Oregon Donation Act. 12 
To qualify for land under the Donation Act, one had to be a citizen living 
in Oregon and had to submit a request for land by December 1, 1850.13 
Interestingly, Neff's land request was originally dated December 15, 1850, 
which would have made it too late, but "December" was crossed out and 
"September" written in above. 14 This is the first instance of many to 
suggest that events surrounding Pennoyer v. Neff may have been tainted by 
fraud and deception. 
Not surprisingly, registration of a Donation Act claim required a certain 
amount of paperwork. In addition to the initial claim, the homesteader was 
required after four years to submit the affidavits of two disinterested 
8. J. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MAsKS OF TilE LAW 141 (1976). 
9. Neff's affidavit, submitted in connection with his land claim, states that he was born in 1826. 
10. Oregon Spectator, Sept. 7, 1848, at 3, col. 1. 
11. !d. The newspaper article noted that a small company of Packers arrived in Oregon City, 
bringing with them news that the House of Representatives had set June 4, 1848, for action on the 
Oregon question. The article went on to note that "it was the general impression among the emigrants 
and others, that Congress would donate a section of land to the heads of families in Oregon and half a 
section to single men." 
12. Neff's claim was number 57, making it among the earliest. 
13. An Act to Create the Office of Surveyor General, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496 (1850) [hereinafter "The 
Donation Act"]. The Act granted 320 acres (a half section) to a single man, and 640 acres (a whole 
section) to a married couple. Interestingly, in the case of a married couple, the land did not go entirely to 
the husband. Instead, half was granted to the wife, "to be held by her in her own right." !d. See 
generally Chused, The Oregon Donation Act of 1850 and Nineteenth Century Federal Married 
Women's Property Law, 2 LAW & HIST. REv. 44 (1984). 
14. Notification to the Surveyor General of Oregon, No. 80, Oregon City Land Donation Files, 
March 9, 1852 [hereinafter Notification to Surveyor General of Oregon] (notice of Claim for land by 
Marcus Neff) (available in Seattle Federal Archives and Record Center, Record Group No. 49). The 
same issue of the Oregon Spectator which announced the arrival of the wagon train in which Neff was 
traveling, also announced the discovery of gold in California. Oregon Spectator, Sept. 7, 1848, at 2, col. 
5. One historian has speculated that upon arriving in Oregon, Neff probably went south to the mines, 
returning to Oregon in the fall of 1850, just in time to file a land claim. King, Pennoyer v. Neff: Legal 
Landmark, 73 OR. HIST. Q. 60 (1972); see Oregon Spectator, Nov. 9, 1848, at2, col. 4 (miners return to 
Oregon with considerable gold; Oregonians urged to go to California gold mines but to retain Oregon 
land claims). Given the correction on Neff's donation claim, it is possible that he returned a little late to 
file a donation claim. 
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persons affirming that the homesteader had cultivated the land for his own 
use. 15 Neff secured two affidavits, which were submitted prematurely in 
1853 and resubmitted in 1856. 16 The 1856 submission should have entitled 
Neff to receive a patent to the land, but the government was notoriously 
slow in processing claims, 17 and ten years passed before Neff received his 
land patent. IS 
Early in 1862 Neff made the unfortunate decision to consult a local 
Portland attorney, J.H. Mitchell. 19 Although the nature of the legal services 
is unclear, Neff may have consulted Mitchell in an attempt to expedite the 
paperwork concerning his land patent. 20 Neff was illiterate, 21 and at the time 
he consulted Mitchell the government had still not issued his patent. 
Mitchell, moreover, specialized in land matters. 22 In mid-1862, several 
months after Neff first consulted Mitchell, another affidavit was filed on 
Neff's behalf. Several months thereafter Neff received a document from the 
government certifying that he had met the criteria for issuance of a patent. 23 
Whatever Neff's reasons for seeking Mitchell's legal services, he cer-
tainly could have done better in his choice oflawyers. "J.H. Mitchell" was 
actually the Oregon alias of one John Hipple. 24 Hipple had been a teacher in 
Pennsylvania who, after being forced to marry the 15-year-old student 
whom he had seduced, left teaching and took up law.25 He practiced with a 
partner for several years, but apparently concluded that it was time to move 
on to greener pastures. Thus, in 1860 Hipple headed west taking with him 
four thousand dollars of client money and his then current paramour, a local 
15. The Donation Act, supra note 13, at§ 7. 
16. Notification to Surveyor General of Oregon, supra note 14. 
17. See Messing, Public Lands, Politics and Progressives: The Oregon Land Fraud Trials, 
1903-10, 35 PAC. HIST. REV. 35, 36 (1966). 
18. Record Copy of Patent, val. 5, at 12 (March 19, 1866) (National Archives, Record Group No. 
49). 
19. See Neffv. Pennoyer, 17F. Cas. 1279, 1286(C.C.D. Or. 1875) (No. 10,083), aff'd, 95 U.S. 714 
(1877). 
20. One reviewer of this period in Oregon has observed that "[b ]oth in Washington and the District 
Land Offices, influence, friendships, family ties, and money were essential for the proper expediting of 
a claim." Messing, supra note 17, at 36. 
21. Neff's affidavits submitted in 1852 and his oath of allegiance submitted in 1862 were both 
marked with "X" in place of Neff's signature. By 1875, Neff had learned at least to write his name. See 
Affidavit of Marcus Neff submitted in McGuire v. Neff, No. 237, District of Oregon (1875). 
22. See I M. CLARK, JR., PHARISEE AMONG PHILISTINES: THE DIARY OF JUDGE MATTHEW P. DEADY 
1871-92, at 150-51 (1975) (hereinafter DEADY DIARY]. 
23. Oregon Donation Certificate No. 1416 to Marcus Neff, Dec. 31, 1862 (available in Seattle 
Federal Archives and Records Center, Record Group No. 49). Nevertheless, four more years passed 
before the general land office granted Neff his patent. Record Copy of Patent, supra note 18. 




school teacher. 26 They made their way to California where Hipple aban-
doned the teacher, ostensibly because she was sick and her medical ex-
penses had become too burdensome,27 and moved on to Portland, Oregon. 
There, using the name John H. Mitchell, 28 he quickly established himself 
as a successful lawyer, specializing in land litigation and railroad right-of-
way cases. 29 He also remarried without bothering to divorce his first wife. 30 
As one historian has observed, Mitchell's success as a lawyer cannot be 
attributed to either intellectual or oratorial skills; rather, his strengths 
included exceptional political instincts, a generous disposition, and a 
friendly handshake. 31 What he lacked in ethics and ability, he made up for 
with persistence and desire for success. 32 In his subsequent political career, 
he became known as a man whose "political ethics justified any means that 
would win the battle. "33 
Mitchell's ethical standards as a lawyer were no higher than his ethics as 
a politician. As the Oregonian observed: "His political methods are indeed 
pitched on a sufficiently low scale, but not below his methods as a 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. Mitchell claimed he had dropped his surname, Hipple, and had taken to using his mother's 
maiden name in order to escape from "great domestic unhappiness." Washington Star, June 16, 1873, 
at 2, col. I. The name change generated its own set of problems. There was some talk of removing him 
from his newly acquired Senate seat becuase he had run under an assumed name. I d. In addition, in 
another law suit in which Mitchell and his partner were apparently trying to acquire land as payment for 
legal services, the defendants argued that there was an improper joinder of parties because John H. 
Mitchell was a mythical personage. See New York Times, Dec. 13, 1873, at 6, col. 7. 
29. 1 DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 151-52; E. MAcCOLL, THE SHAPING OF A CITY: BUSINESS AND 
PoLmcs IN PoRTI.AND, OREGON 1885-1915, at 202 (1976); Silberman, supra note 6, at 44 n.53. 
30. I DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 151-52. After Mitchell's bigamy came to light, there was 
great interest in his views on polygamy in Utah. I d. at 128-29. Ironically, some years after this incident, 
Mitchell criticized the Oregon Donation Act as encouraging too many marriages. Mitchell, Oregon: Its 
History, Geography and Resources, Nat. Geographic Mag., Apr. 20, 1895, at 266. 
31. J. GASTON, THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF OREGON 1811-1912, at 665 (1912). 
32. See id. at 665-66. 
33. I d. at 665. Mitchell had an extremely successful political career. He was first elected to the State 
Senate in 1862, became president of the State Senate in 1864, see id. at 666, was seven times a candidate 
for the United States Senate, and was elected in four of those contests. See id. at 665. Interestingly, 
Mitchell received strong political support from Abigail Scott Duniway, an important leader of the 19th 
century western women's movement. Duniway continued to support Mitchell even after it was revealed 
that Mitchell was a bigamist and an adulterer. Duniway did urge Mitchell to make "restitution" for the 
wrongs he had done to women "by becoming the special champion of the rights of all women. . . . [L]et 
his Senatorial career be one continued grand atonement to all womanhood for the errors of his youth." R. 
MOYNEHAN, REBEL FOR RlGIITS: ABIGAIL Scarr DUNIWAY 173 (1983) (quoting remark made by Mrs. 
Duniway). There is no evidence that Mitchell ever undertook such "atonement." 
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lawyer. "34 Given Mitchell's reputation, one might at least question whether 
Neff in fact owed the money Mitchell claimed was due. Neff paid Mitchell 
$6.50,35 but Mitchell claimed he was owed an additional $209.36 Although 
Mitchell's services were rendered between early 1862 and mid-1863,37 
Mitchell waited several years to take legal action against Neff, perhaps 
purposely waiting until Neff left the state. 
On November 3, 1865, Mitchell filed suit against Neff in Oregon state 
court, seeking $253.14 plus costs.38 Mitchell secured jurisdiction under 
Oregon statute section 55, which provided that if the defendant, after due 
diligence, cannot be found within the state, he may be served by publica-
tion. 39 Mitchell supplied an affidavit in which he asserted that Neff was 
living somewhere in California and could not be found. 40 Mitchell provided 
no details as to what he had done to locate Neff, and given Mitchell's lack of 
scruples,41 one might wonder whether Neff's whereabouts were indeed 
unknown to Mitchell and whether Mitchell made any attempt to locate 
Neff. 42 Notice of the lawsuit was published for six weeks in the Pacific 
34. Morning Oregonian, Aug. 25, 1882, at 2, col. 1. Two incidents illustrate that Mitchell had no 
hesitation about cheating or defrauding his own clients. In one case, a client had consulted Mitchell 
concerning certain debts which the client had incurred. Mitchell apparently notified the creditors of his 
client's whereabouts, and was appointed by the creditors to collect the debt. Mitchell then went back to the 
client and offered in exchange for $600 to tell the creditors that the debt could not be collected. The client 
paid the price. See I DEADY DIARY, supra note22, at 182 (diary entry Jan. 2, 1875). In another incident. 
Mitchell persuaded a recently widowed client to appoint a friend of Mitchell's as guardian of her young 
children. Although the guardian soon disappeared, Mitchell, acting on behalf of the guardian, requested 
that the court order the sale of real estate inherited by the children. The sale was supposedly to pay 
expenses incurred by the guardian in caring for the children, although the children in fact never lived with 
or received any benefit from the guardian. The sale was ordered and Mitchell purchased the land at auction 
for a fraction of its actual value. Mitchell turned around and sold the land at a sizeable profit, while the 
widow and her young children were left destitute. See Morning Oregonian, Aug. 25, 1882, at 2, col. I; 
Morning Oregonian, Nov. 25, 1886, at 4, cols. 1-3. 
35. See Neffv. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. 1279, 1286 (C. C. D. Or. 1875) (No. 10,083), aff'd, 95 U.S. 714 
(1877). 
36. /d. 
37. See Supreme Court Transcript of Record at 7, Penn oyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
38. /d. at 6. Judge Deady's statement of the case indicates that Mitchell sought the sum of$253.14 
and was awarded $258.18 plus $36.80 in costs. See id. No explanation is given why the default judgment 
was $5.04 more than the plaintiff requested. 
39. OR. CooECiv. P. §55. ThetextofthestatuteisreproducedinPennoyerv. Neff, 95 U.S. at718. 
40. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 717. 
41. See supra text accompanying notes 24-37 and infra text accompanying notes 119-23. 
42. In another lawsuit involving Neff's Oregon property, McGuire v. Neff, No. 237 (Circuit Court of 
Oregon for Multnomah County, Complaint dated May 17, 1875), an issue arose whether at the time of that 
suit Neff was a citizen of California or a citizen of Oregon. Neff removed the case on the basis of diversity 
of citizenship and subsequently submitted an affidavit, dated Aug. 30, 1875, in which he asserted that he 
was a citizen of California. Affidavit of Marcus Neff filed August 31, 1875, McGuire v. Neff, Judgment 
No. 255 (C.C.D. Or. 1875). He described his home and property in California and asserted that he had 
been living in San Joaquin County, California for the prior five years. This suggests he did not move to 
California untill870 and thus may still have been in Oregon when Mitchell sued him in 1865. See also 
484 
Pennoyer Reconsidered 
Christian Advocate, 43 a weekly newspaper published under the authority of 
the Methodist Episcopal Church and devoted primarily to religious news 
and inspirational articles. 44 
In initiating the litigation, Mitchell made what ultimately proved to be a 
critical mistake. Mitchell's affidavit asserted that Neff owned property, but 
he did not attach the property at that time. Mitchell most likely neglected 
this step because Oregon law did not appear to require attachment as a 
prerequisite for reliance on section 55.45 
A default judgment in the amount of $294.98 was entered against Neff 
on February 19, 1866.46 Although Mitchell had an immediate right to 
execute on the judgment, he waited until early July 1866 to seek a writ of 
execution, possibly waiting for the arrival of Neff's land patent. The title, 
which was sent from Washington, D.C. on March 22, 1866, would have 
taken several months to arrive in Oregon, and thus probably arrived in 
Oregon shortly before Mitchell sought the writ of execution.47 Inter-
estingly, although Mitchell had alleged that Neff could not be found, the 
Oregon land office apparently had no difficulty delivering the patent to 
Neff.48 
infra note 71. 
43. See Pennoyerv. Neff, 95 U.S. at717. 
44. The publisher's column of the Pacific Christian Advocate describes it as a weekly periodical 
dedicated to issues of religion, temperance, agriculture, education, and general intelligence. · 
45. Or. Code Civ. P. § 55 (1863). There is, however, another small complication regarding this 
matter: at the time Mitchell v. Neff was commenced and even at the time judgment in the case was 
rendered, the government had not yet sent Neff his patent for the land. The patent was not issued until 
March, 1866, see Neffv. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. 1279, 1280, which was a month after the judgment was 
entered in Mitchell v.Nejf. Thus, an argument might have beenmadethatat thetimeoftheaction, Neff did 
not yet own property in Oregon. See Lewis, The "Forum State Interest" Factor inPersonalJurisdiction 
Adjudications: Home-Court Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts, 33 MERCER L. REv. 769, 769-72 
(1982). The practice in Oregon, however, was that if the settler had fulfilled all the prerequisites for 
issuance of the patent, then he was treated as the owner, with full rights to transfer the land. See Dolph v. 
Barney,50r.191,204(1874),aff'd, 97U.S. 652(1878);seealsoActofJuly 17, 1854,ch. 84, § 2, 10Stat. 
305, § 2 (1854). This argument was not made, however, and the opinions of both the lower court and the 
Supreme Court are written on the assumption thatNeffwas theowneratthetimeoftheoriginaljudgment. 
See Pennoyerv. Neff, 95 U.S. at719; Neffv. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. at 1281. 
46. See Neffv. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. at 1280. 
47. See id.; Record Copy of Patent, supra note 18. 
48. According to the Civil Archives Division of the National Archives, the procedure was that the 
patent was issued from the General Land Office in Washington, D.C. and sent to the local land office. In 
the case of Neff's patent, it was sent to the Registrar at Oregon City. The local office was responsible for 
seeing that the title was delivered to the homesteader. If the homesteader could not be found, the patent 
was returned to Washington. There are no notations or correspondence in Neff's file in Washington 
indicating that the patent was ever returned to Washington. Moreover, although the patent might have 
been delivered to Mitchell or someone else, the lower court opinion inPennoyerv. N ejfsuggests that at the 
time of that litigation, Neff was in possession of, and produced, the actual patent. See Neffv. Pennoyer, 17 
F.Cas.at1280. · 
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Under Oregon law, to secure execution one had to obtain a writ of 
execution and post and publish notice for four weeks. 49 All of the steps were 
apparently taken. 50 On August 7, 1866, the property was sold at a sheriff's 
auction for $341.60.51 Notably, the buyer was not Sylvester Pennoyer, as 
the Supreme Court opinion52 and commentators have implied. 53 The prop-
erty was purchased by none other than J.H. Mitchell, who three days later 
assigned the property to Sylvester Pennoyer.54 Pennoyer had much in 
common with Mitchell. He, like Mitchell, was a Portland lawyer, involved 
in politics, 55 and active in real estate speculation. 56 There is no evidence 
available on whether Pennoyer had actual knowledge of, or connection to, 
the original action, though it is certainly possible. 57 Moreover, since he 
took title through Mitchell, it is not clear that he should have been treated as 
a true innocent third party purchaser. 58 
It appears that for the next eight years Pennoyer peacefully minded his 
own business, doing those things one would expect of any property 
owner-he paid the taxes, cut some timber, and sold a small portion of the 
land. 59 The peace was broken in 1874 when Neff reappeared on the scene. 
The evidence suggests that Neff began making trouble for Penn oyer several 
49. See OR. CODECIV. P. §§ 271, 288(2). 
50. Deady's statement of the case says that the property was sold following an order of execution. 
Neffv. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. at 1280. 
51. See id. 
52. Justice Hunt in his dissent states that "the land in question ... was bought by the defendant 
Penn oyer, at a sale upon the judgment in such suit." 95 U.S. at 736 (Hunt, J., dissenting). Justice Field 
does not dispute this statement by Hunt, though his own description of the events is somewhat more 
ambiguous-he merely states that the "defendant claims to have acquired the premises under a sheriff's 
deed." /d. at 719; see also id. at 746 (Hunt, J., dissenting). 
53. See, e.g., J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 100 (1985); Drobak, The 
Federalism Theme in Persona/Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1026 (1983); Lewis, supra note45, at 
772; Silberman, supra note 6, at 44 n.53. 
54. See Neffv. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. at 1280. There is no evidence available concerning the amount 
Pennoyer paid Mitchell for the assignment. See Supreme Court Transcript of Record at 6, Pennoyer v. 
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (stating that the assignment from Mitchell to Pennoyer was "for value re-
ceived"). In his answer in a related lawsuit, see infranotes67-69 and accompanying text, Pennoyerstated 
that the assignment was made "for a valuable consideration." Answer at 3, Neff v. Pennoyer, No. 222 
(C.C. Or. 1875). 
55. Mitchell and Pennoyer were from different political parties-Mitchell was a Republican, Pen-
noyer a Democrat. 
56. See VII (Part 2) DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 445 (D. Malone ed., 1964). 
57. Pennoyer may, of course, have been an innocent dupe. As one observer commented, "He was a 
prey to evil men." E. MACCOLL, supra note 29, at 214 n. 
58. See C. SMITH & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 479 (2d ed. 1971) (basic common 
law rule is that one cannot pass a bettertitle than that which he has; similarly, a purchaser can acquire no 
better title than that of his vendor). 
59. See Neffv. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. 1291 (C.C.D. Or. 1875)(No. 10,085); McGuirev. Neff, No. 237 
(C.C.D. Or. 1875), reprinted in Morning Oregonian, Dec. 7, 1875, at I, col. 6 (plaintiff, who had 
purchased a portion of land from Pennoyer, sought to quiet title). 
486 
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months before he actually filed suit, because in July of 1874 Pennoyer 
began taking steps to protect the validity of his title. It seems that local 
officials had been somewhat lax in the matter of title when the property was 
originally sold at the sheriff's auction. The sheriff's deed was not signed 
until five months after the sale, and then it was signed by the deputy sheriff, 
not the sheriff. 60 In an apparent effort to insure that this carelessness was 
not the basis for an attack on his title, Penn oyer obtained the signature of the 
then current sheriff on a second deed dated July 21, 1874.61 Not taking any 
chances, three days later he acquired still a third deed, this one signed by 
the man who had been sheriff at the time of the sale. 62 But all the 
precautions were for naught; ultimately, Pennoyer was evicted. 
The case of Neffv. Pennoyer was filed in federal court on September 10, 
1874,63 and the ensuing battle confirms that vindictive and protracted 
litigation is not a recent phenomenon. Neff apparently had prospered in 
California. He had settled in San Joaquin with a wife and family, as well as 
servants, property, and livestock. 64 He was prepared, however, to leave his 
home in California and move himself, his wife, and his daughter to Oregon 
for a year to pursue his various legal actions. 65 
The opening salvo between Neff and Pennoyer was fired when Neff sued 
to evict Pennoyer, but the war did not end there. After Pennoyer lost the 
eviction suit, and costs were awarded against him, he battled bitterly over 
the amount of those costs. 66 Neff was again the winner, and adding insult to 
injury, he proceeded to sue Pennoyer again-this time to recover money 
damages sustained as a result of Pennoyer cutting down timber on the 
property. 67 Pennoyer counterclaimed to collect property taxes that he had 
paid from 1866 to 1875.68 The counterclaim was dismissed and Pennoyer's 
defense of the damage action proved to be the closest that he got to a 
victory: the jury found for Neff but awarded only nominal damages. 69 
60. Neffv. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. at 1280. 
61. /d. 
62. !d. 
63. Supreme Court Transcript of Record at 6, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
64. See AffidavitofMarcusNefffiledAugust31, 1875, McGuire v. Neff, Judgment No. 255 (C.C.D. 
Or. 1875). 
65. See id. 
66. Neffv. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. 1290 (C.C.D. Or. 1875) (No. 10,084). 
67. Neffv. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. 1291 (C.C.D. Or. 1875) (No. 10,085). 
68. /d. 
69. Neffv. Pennoyer, Oregon Circuit Journal "A" at 819-20 (Jan. 18, 1876) (available in Seattle 
Federal Archives and Records Center, GSA No. 21 USDC). The battle over the Neff homestead did not 
end with thePennoyer litigation. Enter one Mary Maguire who had purchased a portion of the land from 
Pennoyer. She sued Neff in Oregon state court seeking to clear her title. McGuire v. Neff, No. 237 
(Circuit Court of Oregon for Multnomah County, Complaint dated May 17, 1875). The case was 
removed to federal court, a step which generated a flurry of affidavits and counteraffidavits about 
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When the dust had settled, Penn oyer, whom the Supreme Court assumed 
was a bona fide purchaser for value, was left holding the bag. Penn oyer had 
purchased the land for "valuable consideration" and paid the taxes on it for 
a number of years, yet he found himself evicted, with nothing to show for 
his money and subject to suit for trespass for entering the land he thought he 
owned. There is no evidence that Pennoyer did or could ever recover the loss 
from anyone. 70 
Following the litigation, Neff disappeared into obscurity;71 not so Pen-
noyer and Mitchell. Pennoyer went on to be Governor of Oregon, 72 but he 
remained bitter about his defeat in Pennoyer v. Neff. Ten years after the 
Supreme Court decision, in his inaugural address as governor, Pennoyer 
decried that decision as a usurpation of state power. 73 He remained a 
whether there was diversity. 
Curiously, in the battle over diversity, McGuire seems to have missed an obvious argument. Total 
diversity, as outlined in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), presumably was required 
to remove theM cGuire case to federal court. Although Neff was a citizen of California, McGuire also 
named Neff's attorneys (who had acquired a one-third interest in McGuire's land after Neffv. Pennoyer) 
as codefendants, and they were citizens of Oregon. This would have destroyed diversity and prevented 
removal. Arguably, McGuire's claim against Neff was separate and severable from her claims against 
the lawyers. See The Separable Controversy Act of 1866, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306 (1866). However, given 
that they held an undivided interest in the property whose title she was seeking to clear, this seems a 
little doubtful. Whatever the basis or propriety of the removal, McGuire ultimately lost her claim in 
federal court. See McGuire v. Neff, No. 237 (C.C.D. Or. 1875), reprinted in Morning Oregonian, Dec. 
7, 1875, at l, col. 6. 
70. Pennoyer probably could not recover from Mitchell because it appears that Mitchell conveyed 
by quit claim deed without warranties. See Assignment from Mitchell to Pennoyer, quoted in Neff v. 
Pennoyer, stipulation (filed Sept. 21, 1874). 
71. In an affidavit filed in theM cGuire case, see supra note 42, Neff asserted that he was a citizen of 
California, that he was in Oregon solely for the purpose of pursuing litigation, and that he did not intend 
to remain in Oregon. Whether he in fact returned to California is unclear, but by 1880 he was back in (or 
still in) Oregon and was listed along with his wife and two children in Multnomah County, Oregon in the 
1880 census. Census of 1880, Multnomah County, Oregon at 213. 
72. Pennoyer served two terms as governor, followed by one term as Mayor of Portland. See J. 
GASTON, PORTLAND OREGON: ITS HISTORY AND BUILDERS 372-73 (1911). He was something of a 
maverick as a politician, and was described by former Attorney General Williams as a "political freak," 
E. MAcCot.L, supra note 29, at 210, and by the Morning Oregonian as "peculiar, eccentric, and 
demagogic," Morning Oregonian, May 19, 1890, at 6, col. l; see VII (Part 2) DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN 
BIOGRAPHY 445-46 (D. Malone ed., 1964). The Morning Oregonian was no fan of Pennoyer. In an 
editorial, it said of him: "On all large public questions throughout his life he has been conspicuously, 
absurdly wrong . . . . We do not say that Mr. Pennoyerneverdeviates into sense. Doubtless he does, at 
times-when the subject is one of no particular or public importance; but they who have known him 
longest never knew him to entertain sound opinions on any important public question." Morning 
Oregonian, May 19, 1890, at 6, cots. l-2. In a characteristic demonstration of his independence, 
Governor Penn oyer proclaimed Oregon's Thanksgiving holiday to be one week later than the date set by 
President Cleveland. See id.; E. MACCOLL, supra note 29, at 210. 
73. Inaugural address of Governor Sylvester Pennoyer to the Legislative assembly of the State of 
Oregon 28 (1887). This speech was viewed as something of an embarrassment, at least by some. See 2 
DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 510 (diary entry Jan. 15, 1887). The Oregonian published a satire of the 
speech in which Pennoyer is quoted as saying: 
Some years ago I had a lawsuit with Mr. Neff. It was in the federal courts and finally in the supreme 
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vociferous critic of the Supreme Court, urging at one point that the entire 
Court should be impeached, explaining: "We have during this time been 
living under a government not based upon the Federal Constitution, but 
under one created by the plausible sophistries of John Marshall . . . . Our 
constitutional government has been supplanted by a judicial oligarchy. "74 
Mitchell also remained in the public eye. He was elected to the United 
States Senate in 1872, lost his senate seat in 1879, but was reelected in 
1885.75 By modem standards, Mitchell's reelection is quite extraordinary. 
Shortly before the 1885 election, Judge Deady, the lower court judge in 
Pennoyer v. Neff, came into possession of a set oflove letters which Mitchell 
had written to Mitchell's second wife's younger sister during the five years 
that he carried on an affair with her. 76 Deady turned the love letters over to a 
newspaper, the Oregonian, 77 an outspoken critic of Mitchell. The Ore-
gonian willingly published the letters for all to read and enjoy. 78 Despite the 
scandal, Mitchell was elected four days later, something which Deady called 
"a disgrace to the state and a reproach to humanity. "79 
Scandal was a way oflife for Mitchell. In 1905 he, along with a number 
of other prominent Oregon officials, was indicted in connection with a 
massive land fraud scheme. 80 The scheme was a simple one. Following the 
Donation Act, Congress had passed the Homestead Act of 1862 and the 
Timber and Stone Act of 1878, all of which offered small tracts ofland to 
court of the United States and was decided against me. I have carefully examined the federal 
constitution, and I do not find there any authority delegated to the federal government to decide a 
case against me. That decision was, therefore, a clear usurpation. That soured me on federal 
courts. 
Morning Oregonian, Jan. 22, 1887, at 4, col. 3. 
74. 3 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 425 (1924l(quoting Pennoyer). 
Pennoyer's dislike of the Supreme Court apparently was expressed often and became known as 
"Pennoyerism." See T. GREER, FIFIY YEARS IN OREGON: ExPERIENCES, OBSERVATIONS AND COMMEN-
TARIES UPON MEAN, MEAsURES AND CUSTOMS IN PIONEER TiMEs AND LATER 331-32 (1912). Pennoyer 
was not, however, entirely consistent in his view that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to invalidate 
state laws. The Morning Oregonian reported that when the Supreme Court "issued an injunction that 
prevented for a time the erection of a bridge over the Willamette River below his sawmill, he came 
forward with congratulations on the courage and spirit of a court that would assume jurisdiction and 
overthrow a state law that he did not want." Morning Oregonian, May 19, 1890, at 6, col. 2. 
75. Morning Oregonian, Nov. 19, 1885, at I, col. 6. 
76. 2 DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 417 (diary entry July 28, 1883), 435-36 (Appendix A, 1883). 
77. /d. at 480 (diary entry Nov. 14, 1885), 435-36 (Appendix A, 1883). 
78. Morning Oregonian, Nov. 14, 1885, at 2, cols. 1-4. The Oregonian was so outraged by 
Mitchell's behavior that it published letters with the hope that Mitchell would sue for libel, and thus 
further expose his sordid past. Mitchell was not to be caught in that trap, however, and simply denied the 
allegations and claimed that the letters were fraudulent. See Morning Oregonian, Nov. 16, 1885, at 4, 
cols. 1-5. 
79. 2 DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at480 (diary entry Dec. 21, 1885). The day before the election, 
Deady predicted that the letters would not change the result, observing that Mitchell "is alone in 
making fornication a means of salvation." /d. (diary entry Dec. 14, 1885). 
80. See Messing, supra note 17. 
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individual settlers. Aspiring lumber barons, trying to assemble large tracts 
of land, transported huge numbers of settlers to land offices to file dummy 
applications. With a few well placed bribes, the applications would be 
approved and the settlers would then transfer their deeds in exchange for a 
modest payoff.81 In July of 1905, while still serving in the United States 
Senate, Mitchell was convicted and sentenced to six months in jail, a 
$1 , 000 fine, and complete disbarment from public office. 82 In December of 
that same year, while his appeal was pending, Mitchell died, apparently 
from complications following a tooth extraction. 83 The Daily Oregon 
Statesman reported that the Senate adjourned without any official recogni-
tion of Mitchell's death, though the chaplain "recalled the situation to mind 
in his prayer by referring pointedly to corruption and death and by praying 
that the members of the senate might be given strength to bear each other's 
burdens. "84 Possibly moved by the chaplain's prayer, the Senate later 
passed a resolution to pay Mitchell's funeral expenses. 85 
This fraudulent scheme is interesting not only because it was the last and 
among the most public of the scandals that had become a way of life for 
Mitchell, but also because the nature of the scheme itself raises a nagging, 
though unanswerable question: Were the initial transactions between Neff 
and Mitchell part of an aborted fraudulent arrangement? One can only 
wonder.86 
II. THE COURTS' HANDLING OF THE CASE 
A. Judge Deady's Approach 
The lower court opinion, written by Judge Matthew Deady, 87 merits 
81. See E. MAcCOLL, supra note 29, at 288-98. 
82. See Daily Oregon Statesman, July 4, 1905, at I, col. 3; Messing, supra note 17, at 56. 
83. See Daily Oregon Statesman, Dec. 9, 1905, at 5, col. I; Messing, supra note 17, at 56. 
84. Daily Oregon Statesman, Dec. 12, 1905, at I, col. 3. The paper further observed that this was 
"the first time the death of a senator was permitted to pass unnoticed by the senate." 
85. 40 CONG. REC. 1738 (1906). 
86. Information concerning this fraudulent scheme also raises another intriguing though unprova-
ble possibility. It was not uncommon for bribes to be paid to officials in connection with the processing 
of land claims. See Messing, supra note 17, at 36. If it was in connection with his land claim that Neff 
consulted Mitchell, one wonders whether the dispute between Mitchell and Neff was about the 
reimbursement of bribe money paid by Mitchell to secure Neff's patent. 
87. Mitchell was not the only one who had problems with his name. See supra note 28. In 1853, 
Deady was appointed to the territorial bench of Oregon. Inexplicably, his commission was issued in the 
name of "Mordecai Paul Deady" instead of Matthew Paul Deady. The reason for the error remains 
unclear, seeM. CLARK, EDEN SEEKERS 265-66 (1981), but when word of the error reached Washington, 
President Pierce withdrew his nomination of Deady and repaid a political debt by appointing Odadiah 
B. McFadden. Ultimately, McFadden was transferred to the newly-created Washington territory and 
Deady was reappointed under the correct name. See W. WOODWARD, THE RISE AND EARLY HISTORY OF 
POLffiCAL PARTIES IN OREGON, 1843-1868, at 76-77 (1913). 
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closer scrutiny than it has received. Judge Deady, like the Supreme Court, 
found for Neff, but his rationale was more limited in scope. Deady's 
opinion is interesting, not only because the approach is strikingly modem, 
but also because it provides a useful counterpoint to the Supreme Court 
opinion. The Supreme Court affirmed Judge Deady, but on the basis of a 
different and much broader rationale. The fact that Justice Field chose to 
reject a more narrow approach which would have achieved the same result 
may suggest that he was less concerned with the particular case before him 
and more concerned with creating precedent. 
Deady's opinion is long, careful, and quite conservative in approach. His 
analysis was limited to the question whether there was quasi-in-rem jurisdic-
tion. He did not discuss whether there could have been in personam jurisdic-
tion because, as he noted, all the parties agreed that there was no in personam 
jurisdiction. 88 His approach is based solely on state statutory construction, 
an area in which Deady was particularly knowledgeable since it was he who 
drafted the Oregon Code. 89 Although he acknowledged that "it is the duty of 
the state to deal justly and considerately with nonresidents who have prop-
erty within her jurisdiction," he concluded that matters pertaining to the 
"mode of proceeding" are within the "absolute control" of the state.90 
Deady considered three specific objections to the original proceeding: (1) 
the order of publication was made without sufficient evidence that Mitchell 
had a cause of action against Neff;91 (2) Mitchell's affidavit was inadequate 
because it did not describe what diligence had been used to ascertain Neff's 
place of residence;92 and (3) the affidavit was made by the editor of the 
newspaper rather than by the "printer" as required by the statute. 93 
Deady rejected the first argument. He noted that the only evidence for 
Mitchell's valid cause of action against Neff was the verified complaint 
itself and that "it is questionable whether even the complaint states facts 
sufficient to prove the existence of a cause of action. "94 He concluded, 
88. Neff, 11 F. Cas. at 1280-81. The Oregon statute extended in personam jurisdiction only to 
persons who appeared in court, were "found within the state," or were a "resident thereof." OR. CODE 
CIV. P. § 506; see 11 F. Cas. at 1281. 
89. Deady drafted in 1862 the Oregon Code of Civil Procedure, along with its 1874 revisions. See 
Beardsley, Code Making in Early Oregon, 23 OR. L. REv. 22, 49-53 (1943); Peters, The "First" 
Oregon Code: Another Look at Deady's Role, 82 OR. HIST. Q. 383 (1981). 
90. Neff, 11 F. Cas. at 1282. 
91. /d. at 1284. 
92. /d. at 1286. 
93. /d. at 1287. 
94. /d. at 1286. He further observed that, "Concerning the material circumstances of time, place 
and amount, this affidavit is wholly silent, and whether this supposed cause of action arose upon an 
indebtedness of one mill for a small measure of moonshine or a million of dollars for as many miles of 
land, is left to conjecture." /d. at 1285. 
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however, that there was sufficient evidence to insulate the original judg-
ment from a collateral attack. 95 
Although Deady presumed from the record that Mitchell had a valid 
cause of action, he accepted the other two arguments concerning notice. 
His conclusion that the newspaper editor's affidavit did not meet the 
statutory requirement of a "printer's" affidavit might be dismissed as an 
overly literal reading of the statute. 96 Nevertheless, his construction of the 
provisions relevant to Mitchell's affidavit seems quite sensible. The Oregon 
statutes provided for service by publication when "the defendant after due 
diligence cannot be found within the state. "97 In addition, the Code 
mandated that in case of publication the court shall also direct a copy of the 
summons and complaint to be mailed to the defendant at his place of 
residence, "unless it shall appear that such residence is neither known to 
the party making the application, nor can with reasonable diligence be 
ascertained by him. "98 Pursuant to these provisions, Mitchell had filed an 
affidavit stating that Neff "is a nonresident of this state; that he resides 
somewhere in the State of California, at what place affiant knows not. "99 
Mitchell's affidavit, however, had given no indication of what steps, if any, 
Mitchell had taken to locate Neff. 100 Construing the two relevant Oregon 
provisions together, Deady concluded that evidence of diligence in at-
tempting to locate the defendant must appear in the affidavit. 101 He noted 
that the law was not intended to be "a means of spoiling nonresidents" and 
that the statutory scheme was designed to ensure that defendants got notice 
"if possible. " 102 Deady recognized that a nonresident defendant was un-
likely to get actual notice when service is by mere publication. JOJ More-
over, the likelihood of actual notice is particularly small when, as in this 
case, the notice is published "in a weekly newspaper of denominational 
circulation within the state, and practically none without it." 104 Deady 
concluded that because this statutory scheme was designed to ensure that 
defendant get notice "if possible," it was critical that the plaintiff's 
affidavit demonstrate that diligence was used in the attempt to locate the 
defendant. 
95. /d. 
96. /d. at 1287-88. 
97. OR. CODE CIV. P. §55. 
98. /d. §56. 
99. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 717 (1877) (quoting Mitchell's affidavit). 
100. See Transcript of Record at 7, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 






Deady's analysis of state law proved well founded, 105 and was consistent 
with contemporaneous treatises, 106 and the approach other states had 
taken.I07 In addition, a fair reading of a prior United States Supreme Court 
case suggests that failure to comply with such statutory requirements was a 
basis for a collateral attack. The case, Galpin v. Page, 108 written by none 
other than Justice Field, held that where service on a nonresident is by 
publication, a judgment may be collaterally attacked and invalidated where 
there has been a failure to comply literally with the statutory requirements 
for service.109 While Galpin permitted a collateral attack to determine 
whether there had been compliance with statutory requirements, Field 
nowhere suggested that the prior judgment might be struck down where 
those statutory requirements in fact had been met.llO 
105. Subsequent Oregon decisions confirmed Deady's view that an adequate affidavit was a 
statutory prerequisite to jurisdiction. See Goodale v. Coffee, 24 Or. 346, 354, 33 P. 990 (1893); see also 
Odell v. Campbell, 9 Or. 298 (1881). 
106. An 1873 treatise stated that "if the state requires certain steps to be taken as a prerequisite to 
jurisdiction, then a deficiency in respect thereto cannot be supplied by intendment or presumptions of 
law." D. RORER, A TREATISE ON TilE LAW OF JUDICIAL AND EXECUTION SALES § 47 (1873). 
107. The California and Iowa Supreme Courts had upheld collateral attacks on judgments where 
the publication and notice requirements were not complied with literally. Townsend v. Tallant, 33 Cal. 
45 (1867); McGahen v. Carr, 6 Iowa 330 (1858); Ehrenzweig & Mills, Personal Service Outside the 
State, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 385 & n.17 (1953). The Iowa decision is particularly interesting. Iowa's 
statute requiring publication and the mailing of notice was almost identical to Oregon's. The defendant 
to the original action who had lost by default alleged that notice had not in fact been mailed to him. The 
court sustained this collateral attack. 
108. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350 (1873). Galpin was discussed in Deady's opinion, Neff, 17 F. Cas. at 
1283, and also in the briefs submitted to the Supreme Court. Field did not address that case at all, 
although Justice Hunt, in dissent, noted that Galpin "is cited in hostility to the views I have expressed." 
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 743. Professor Hazard, in his article on Pennoyer, suggests that the statement by 
Hunt indicates that there must have been an earlier version of Field's opinion which did cite Galpin. 
Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. Cr. REv. 241, 263 n.78. It seems 
equally possible that Hunt's comments on Galpin were directed at the parties, who discussed and relied 
on that case. 
109. As Field stated in Galpin, "When, therefore, by legislation of a State constructive service of 
process by publication is substituted in place of personal citation, and the court upon such service is 
authorized to proceed against the person of an absent party, not a citizen of the State nor found within it, 
every principle of justice exacts a strict and literal compliance with the statutory provisions." 85 U.S. 
(18 Wall.) at 369. Despite Galpin, the Court in Pennoyer held that the affidavit could not be collaterally 
attacked. Justice Field may have had some reservations about this portion of the opinion since he notes 
that as to this issue there was "some difference of opinion among the members of this court." Pennoyer, 
95 U.S. at 721. If Field had doubts about the majority's resolution of this issue, those doubts would 
seem to be well founded. The result of the majority's ruling is that if a judge accepts as adequate an 
affidavit which is clearly inadequate and, as a result, the defendant gets no notice, the defendant can 
attack that affidavit only by appealing the decision as to which he had no notice. 
110. In Galpin, just as in Pennoyer, Field cites Justice Story for the proposition that no sovereign 
can extend its process beyond its own territorial limits. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 367. In Galpin, however, 
Field uses Story for the more limited proposition that where the record shows the defendant was outside 
the state at the time of service, the presumption of jurisdiction is eliminated. Field explained that 
"where the special powers conferred are exercised in a special manner, not according to the course of 
the common law, or where the general powers of the court are exercised over a class not within its 
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Throughout his opinion, including the discussion of Mitchell's affidavit, 
Deady gives no indication of who Mitchell was or what his reputation for 
honesty was. Nonetheless, one suspects that Deady's holding concerning 
the requirements for the affidavits may have been influenced by his knowl-
edge of Mitchell. 111 In Deady's analysis of the need for a more detailed 
affidavit, one gets the sense Deady believed that in this case the defect was 
no technical failure and that it was likely Mitchell had not used the requisite 
diligence. Deady notes that the original court order directing service by 
publication was made "without any evidence that the plaintiff [Mitchell] 
had ever used any diligence to ascertain such place of residence, or even 
that he was not conveniently and intentionally ignorant of the fact." 112 The 
suggestion that Mitchell might have ignored the statutory requirement of 
diligence or that he might have been "conveniently and intentionally 
ignorant" of the facts is certainly consistent with Deady's low opinion of 
Mitchell. 
There is no question that by the time of Neffv. Pennoyer, Deady knew of 
Mitchell's lack of scruples. 113 Deady was not only a distinguished jurist and 
long time resident of Oregon, he was also an acute observer of life and 
politics in Oregon. 114 He kept extensive diaries in which he referred to the 
events and prominent people of the day. By the timeNeffv. Pennoyer arose, 
Mitchell's prior activities in Pennsylvania and his bigamous marriage had 
received wide public attention in Oregon and Deady had closely followed 
the scandal. 115 By June of 1873, Deady thought all of the scandals would be 
ordinary jurisdiction upon the performance of prescribed conditions, no such presumption of jurisdic-
tion will attend the judgment of the court." /d. at 371. In that case, California sought to exercise 
jurisdiction over a nonresident through service by publication. Field gave no indication that the state 
lacked the authority to do this. He simply held that because this exercise of jurisdiction was "not 
according to the course of common law" that the statutory requirements must be strictly complied with. 
Ill. Deady also knew Pennoyer-he is referred to from time to time in Deady's diary. While there 
is no indication that Deady held Pennoyer in the same contempt he held Mitchell, there are indications 
that he did not hold Pennoyer in particularly high regard. Not long after he decided Neffv. Pennoyer 
Deady speculates that a piece of doggerel apparently critical of Deady was probably the work of 
Pennoyer. I DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 191 (diary entry May 9, 1875). In January 1887, Deady says 
of Pennoyer's inaugural address: "He has made a laughing stock of himself as I knew he would if 
elected." 2 id. at 510 (diary entry Jan. 15, 1887). See supra note 74. Later, in his diaries, Deady refers to 
Pennoyer as "Silpester Annoyer," id. at 551 (diary entry Feb. 23, 1889), and a "Jacobin." /d. at 558 
(diary entry August 10, 1889). 
112. Neff, 17 F. Cas. at 1287. 
113. See, e.g., I DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 128 (diary entry June 7, 1873), 142 (diary entry 
Dec. 8, 1873), 182 (diary entry Jan. 2, 1875). In 1873, Deady was presented with a petition against 
Mitchell. Deady indicated that had he not been on the bench he would have signed it. /d. at 143 (diary 
entry Dec. 18, 1873). 
114. As one historian has observed, "Deady's personal correspondence reveals a cutting wit, a 
cynical view of human nature and of the political process, and a robust interest in the dynamics of life 
about him." Peters, supra note 89, at 392. 
115. See I DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 129 (diary entry June 9, 1873). 
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the end of Mitchell. As he explained: "I think he [Mitchell] must go down. 
Seduction, desertion, theft, clandestine change of name and absconding 
and bigamy are too much for a man to carry in the Senate, though he is 
making a desparate [sic] fight of it." 116 Mitchell nonetheless survived and 
even flourished. As time went by, Deady's diary entries displayed an 
increasing contempt for the man.117 After 1873, Deady generally referred 
to Mitchell by his born name, Hipple. On election day in 1876 Deady stated 
in disgust: "Have not voted for Congressman since the Republicans put 
Hipple in the platform in 1873 and don't think I will until they take him out 
"118 
Deady also had further reason to doubt Mitchell's integrity. In 1873, 
allegations of bribery by Mitchell and others surfaced in connection with a 
Senate election.119 Deady recorded in his diary that Ben Holliday, a 
political ally of Mitchell's had reportedly spent $20,000 in bribes in order 
to buy the votes necessary to ensure Mitchell's election. 120 Deady, along 
with the United States Attorney in Oregon, pushed for a prompt and 
thorough investigation of the matter. When one grand jury refused to return 
an indictment Deady ordered a new grand jury.l2l It looked like indict-
ments might be returned until Mitchell managed to use further bribery to 
bring the investigation to a halt. The Attorney General at that time, George 
H. Williams, also from Oregon, had recently been nominated to the United 
States Supreme Court but his confirmation was in doubt. Senator Mitchell 
approached Williams and offered to vote for confirmation if in exchange 
Williams would halt the grand jury. Williams agreed and ordered the 
Oregon United States Attorney to drop the matter. When he refused, 
116. !d. at 128 (diary entry June 7, 1873). 
117. See, e.g., id. at 127-29 (diary entries May 31 to June 9, 1873), 142 (diary entry Dec. 8, 1873), 
220(diaryentryNov. 7, 1876),222(diaryentryDec.18, 1876);2id. at400(diaryentry Aug. 26, 1882), 
468 (diary entry June 6, 1885). With characteristically biting wit, Deady commented frequently on 
Mitchell's romantic activities. In one entry, Deady mentions Mitchell's early exit from a party they had 
both attended and notes: "Of course some evil minded persons will be found to say that M[itchell] 
preferred to spend the time with his hostess upstairs . . . . "!d. at 524 (diary entry Oct. 15, 1887). In 
another place Deady compares Mitchell with William Kissane, another politician with a sordid past and 
observes that "on the woman question M[itchell] is a long ways ahead, and some of the back counties of 
Pennsylvania still to hear from . . . . "!d. at 515 (diary entry April23, 1887). 
118. 1 id. at 220 (diary entry Nov. 7, 1876). 
119. See id. at 154-55. This election was not the first in which allegations of voter fraud were raised 
against Mitchell. Similar allegations surfaced in connection with Mitchell's unsuccessful1866 bid for 
the United States Senate. See J. GASTON, supra note 31, at 666-67. 
120. 1 DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 80 (diary entry May 20, 1872);see E. MAcCOLL, supra note 
29, at 40. 
121. See 1 DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 155. Deady was under a great deal of pressure on this 
matter and there apparently were threats to abolish his job orremove him from office./d., at 134 (diary 
entry Aug. 27, 1873); see id. at 154-55. 
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Williams fired him. 122 Commenting on this incident, Deady called the 
removal of the United States Attorney "[a]n atrocious act for which 
W[illiams] & M[itchell] deserve severe punishment." 123 
Thus, it is not at all surprising that Deady would focus on Mitchell's 
affidavit. He viewed the case not in the global terms that Field did, but as a 
battle between one plaintiff and one defendant under circumstances which 
raised a high likelihood of fraud. He wrote an opinion of limited scope that 
dealt with the particular injustice demonstrated by the facts of the case. 
Though Deady's opinion remains obscure, it is strikingly modern in 
approach. If Pennoyer v. Neff arose today, it is to Deady's approach that a 
modern-day Neff would have looked for protection. The original suit 
involved legal services rendered in Oregon by an Oregon lawyer to a client 
then living in Oregon, and those legal services quite possibly concerned 
land located in Oregon. All of this would unquestionably be sufficient to 
constitute the "minimum contacts" necessary for the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over Neff. 124 Of course, a modern-day Neff would be entitled 
to personal notice, but only if he could be found. 125 How would we protect a 
modern-day Neff from a modern-day scoundrel like Mitchell who might 
fraudulently assert that the defendant could not be found? By requiring, as 
Deady required, an affidavit that specifically describes the steps that were 
taken to locate the defendant. 
B. Field's Approach 
1. Field's Opinion 
Field's opinion is very different from Deady's. Although Field was 
undoubtedly familiar with at least some of the scandal concerning 
Mitchell, !26 his focus was not on the affidavit or even the problem of 
notice. 127 He dismissed rather summarily the rationale of the lower court 
122. See id.; E. MAcCoLL, supra note 29, at 203. 
123. I DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 142 (diary entry Dec. 8, 1873). Williams did suffer some 
punishment-he was never confirmed as Chief Justice, owing at least in part to this incident. See id. at 
147 n.72. 
124. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
125. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317-18 (1950). 
126. Stories about Mitchell and the scandal surrounding him had been published in the New York 
Times and Washington Star, as well as in the Oregon papers. Field was from California, corresponded 
regularly with Deady and sat circuit with Deady in Oregon. Field had been active in politics before his 
appointment to the Supreme Court and remained politically active. The New York Times reported that 
the scandal was widely publicized throughout the east coast. New York Times, June 14, 1873, at 2, col. 
2. Thus, Field's knowledge of Mitchell's reputation seems likely. 
127. Professor Hazard suggests that a major concern for Field was the notice problem. Hazard, 
supra note 108, at 245; see also Drobak, supra note 53, at 1028. Nevertheless, Hazard notes, on the 
notice issue the Pennoyer opinion is a disaster. Hazard, supra note 108, at 261-62, 270. As discussed 
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and devoted the bulk of the opinion to matters which were not addressed by 
the court below. 
Field's opinion is somewhat disorganized, but the essential elements can 
be easily summarized. First, although the opinion held that the defects in 
the affidavits were not a basis for a collateral attack, 128 the Court nonethe-
less found a jurisdictional defect which invalidated the sale. 129 Specifically, 
earlier, Deady's opinion is far more successful at dealing with the problem of notice than is Field's. 
Field was not a man of weak intellect. Thus, one must suspect that his comments about notice did not in 
fact reflect his primary concern, but were instead incidental. 
128. Field notes some members of the Court disagree on this point. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 721. See 
supra note 109. . 
129. Field assumed, as did Deady, that if the original judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction, 
then the execution on that judgment was necessarily also void. None of the parties argued to the 
contrary and today it is generally asserted that if the underlying judgment is void, the execution of that 
judgment is void and passes no title. See 30 AM. JUR. 2o Executions § 10 (1967); see also Lincoln-
Mercury-Phoenix, Inc. v. Base, 84 Ariz. 9, 322 P.2d 891, 894 (1958); City of Los Angeles v. Morgan, 
105 Cal. App. 2d 726,731,234 P.2d 319,322 (1951); Straw, Off-RecordRisksfor BonaFide Purchasers 
of Interests in Rea/Property, 72 DICK. L. REv. 35,74-75 (1967); 33 C.J.S. Executions§ 299 (a) (1942). 
Not self-evident, however, is the situation where the execution has been fully consummated and the 
property passed to an innocent third party purchaser. In such a situation, it may not be proper to permit 
the judgment debtor to recover the property, at least where steps were taken at the execution phase 
which would be adequate to confer jurisdiction. If the court had proper jurisdiction at the execution 
phase, then one could require the defendant to raise at that time all objections to the execution, or to 
waive those objections. This analysis is easiest to follow where enforcement is sought in a different state 
than the state that originally rendered the judgment. In such a case, the enforcement is a separate 
proceeding that requires an independent jurisdictional basis and the judgment debtor can defeat the 
execution by successfully challenging the jurisdiction of the executing state. SeeR. CASAD, JURISDIC-
TION IN CIVIL ACTIONS ~ 6.02[2][a] (1983) and cases cited therein. Given the rule that the last judgment 
is entitled to full faith and credit, see Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 76-77 (1939), it 
would seem quite appropriate to hold that where the enforcing forum had personal jurisdiction and the 
judgment debtor failed to raise the invalidity of the underlying judgment, the enforcement of that 
judgment was valid and could not be collaterally attacked. One might object that this analysis permits a 
plaintiff to bootstrap an invalid judgment into a valid one. On closer examination, however, this 
procedure does not seem at all unfair to the defendant. If, at the time of the execution, the court ordering 
the execution has jurisdiction and the defendant receives notice and has a full opportunity to challenge 
the validity of the prior judgment, then the defendant should not be permitted simply to stand by and 
allow a bona fide purchaser to buy the land. See D. RoRER, supra note 106, § 1058 (an execution debtor 
can not challenge the validity of an execution sale where the debtor has knowledge of the sale but 
"silently stand[s] by and suffers others to purchase"). See generally Roosevelt Hardware v. Green, 72 
A.D.2d 261, 424 N.Y.S.2d 276, 279 n.1 (App. Div. 1980) (stating that even where the underlying 
judgment is void, the doctrine of laches might limit a judgment debtor's right to recover the property; 
"purchasers at judicial sales are not subject to the arbitrary whims of judgment debtors who may seek to 
recover their properties at any time"). 
This same analysis could be applied even where execution is in the same forum that rendered the 
underlying judgment. If, at the time of the execution, the defendant were served in-state or if the court 
took sufficient steps to confer quasi-in-rem jurisdiction (such as attaching the property and posting 
notice, see Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727), then one could argue that there was jurisdiction to execute the 
judgment and the defendant had to come forward at that time with his objections or lose them. 
Apparently, in Pennoyer those steps were taken at the execution phase which would be sufficient to 
confer quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50. While one might complain 
that Neff had no actual notice of the execution, he had as much notice as Field thought a debtor was ever 
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the Court held that quasi-in-rem jurisdiction was never acquired because 
Neff's property in Oregon had not been attached at the beginning of the 
litigation. 130 Field thought it self-evident that the property must be attached 
at the beginning of the suit in order to secure quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. 13! 
Field did not cite any authority for this proposition and in fact a number of 
states permitted quasi-in-rem jurisdiction without prior seizure. 132 Un-
daunted by a lack of authority, Field reasoned that attachment at the 
beginning of the suit was necessary in order to prevent an unacceptable 
uncertainty about the validity of the judgment prior to the actual attachment 
of the property. m 
The second aspect of the opinion is a discussion of why there was not in 
personam jurisdiction-a completely unnecessary element of the opinion. 
Having concluded that there was no quasi-in-rem jurisdiction the opinion 
could have stopped there. As Deady noted, the Oregon Code did not permit 
in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident, and both parties conceded that 
the judgment was not binding in personam. 134 Field nonetheless proceeded 
entitled to in any quasi-in-rem proceeding. 
130. Deady had considered this argument and rejected it, concluding that if the defendant had 
property in the state, then the state had the power to exercise quasi-in-rem jurisdiction and that the 
timing of the attachment was "a matter for the state to determine." Neff, 17 F. Cas. at 1281. 
131. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 728. 
132. See, e.g., Cleland v. Tavernier, 11 Minn. 194 (1866); Eaton v. Badger, 33 N.H. 228 (1856); 
Jarvis v. Barrett, 14 Wis. 591 (1861); Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The 
"Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 306 (1956); Fraser, Actions in Rem, 34 
CORNELL L.Q. 29, 38-40 (1948); Hazard, supra note 108, at 269; Note, The Requirement of Seizure in 
the Exercise of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction: Pennoyer v. Neff Re-Examined, 63 HARV. L. REv. 657, 
659-60 (1950); see also Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308, 320 (1870) ("whetherthe writ [of 
attachment] should have been issued simultaneously with the institution of the suit, or at some other 
stage of its progress, cannot be a question of jurisdiction . . . . "). 
133. Field's conclusion that prior attachment of the property is a necessary prerequisite to quasi-in-
rem jurisdiction is not well explained and it is on this point that Justice Hunt disagreed with the majority. 
See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 741-43 (Hunt, J., dissenting). The uncertainty which troubled Field is, of 
course, an appropriate concern for plaintiffs who would not want to find in the middle of litigation that 
they could no longer get a valid judgment. See Jarvis v. Barrett, 14 Wis. 591, 594, 596 (1861). That 
certainty is also an appropriate concern for local authorities who might not want their courts to waste 
time on cases which could later be terminated for lack of jurisdiction. What Field never explains is why 
these concerns rise to the level of a constitutional infirmity. If the plaintiff and the local courts are 
prepared to accept the uncertainty and wastefulness of potentially futile litigation, why should the 
federal courts--or any other courts--care? Of course, the defendant may not want to waste his time on a 
lawsuit that could turn out to be futile, but the defendant has complete control of the situation. So long as 
the defendant retains property in the forum, the court will retain jurisdiction. 
Possibly Field was concerned because he felt there was some question as to whether Neff actually 
owned the land at the time of the first proceeding since Neff had not yet received his patent. However, 
neither of the parties raised this issue and, by the time the case got to the Supreme Court, Oregon had 
held that a settler who had fulfilled all of the prerequisites for issuance of the patent was a full owner of 
the land whether or not he had received the actual patent. See Dolph v. Barney, 5 Or. 191,204 (1874); 
see supra note 45. 
134. Neff, 17 F. Cas. at 1280-81. 
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to discuss at length the circumstances under which in personam jurisdiction 
could be exercised.135 Field held that in personam jurisdiction was .proper 
only where the defendant was served with process within the state, volun-
tarily appeared, or otherwise consented to jurisdiction.136 This position 
was not as universally accepted as Field suggested.m Not only was there 
contrary authority in other countries, 138 but the statutes of New York and 
California, the two states with whose laws Field surely would have been 
familiar, appeared to authorize in personam jurisdiction without in-state 
service. 139 
Field's final and most startling step was to introduce the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment into his jurisdictional analysis. 140 This 
step was unnecessary and surprising for several reasons. First, that clause 
had not been raised or argued by either party or by the court below. Second, 
Field had already concluded that the federal courts were not required to 
(and hence would not) enforce the prior Oregon judgment.141 Third, the 
due process discussion was dictum for the additional reason that the 
135. Much of Field's discussion of jurisdiction can be traced to Neff's brief. Although Pennoyer's 
argument was based solely on the theory that the court had in rem jurisdiction, Neff's attorneys devoted 
the majority of their brief to discussing when in personam jurisdiction could be exercised. Neff's brief 
was the one that introduced concepts drawn from international law and that quoted Justice Story for the 
proposition that "[n]o sovereign can extend its process beyond its own territorial limits." Respondent's 
Briefat2-3, Pennoyerv. Neff, 95U.S. 714(1877). Of course, becausePennoyerdidnotassertthatthere 
was in personam jurisdiction, his brief did not dispute or analyze any of Neff's assertions on this 
subject. 
136. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 729, 735. 
137. See id. at 722 (discussing "two well-established principles of public law" concerning 
jurisdiction). 
138. For example, Article 14 of the French Code Napoleon of 1804 provided: "An alien, though not 
residing in France, can be cited before the French courts, for the performance of obligations contracted 
by him in France with a Frenchman; he can be brought before French courts for obligations contracted 
by him in a foreign country toward Frenchmen." See de Vries & Lowenfeld, Jurisdiction in Personal 
Actions-A Comparison of Civil Law Views, 44 IOWA L. REv. 306, 317 (1959) (quoting Code); see 
Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory?, 26 KAN. L. REv. 61 (1977); 
Ehrenzweig, supra note 132, at 289 n.3, 299, 308; Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 
22 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 797-99 (1955); Note, Jurisdiction Over Non-residents in Persona/Actions, 5 
COLUM. L. REv. 436 (1905). 
139. 1851 Practice Act of California, Calif. Stats. 1851, title ill, ch.5, §§ 30, 31; New York Code of 
Procedure§ 114 (1848); see Ehrenzweig & Mills, supra note 107, at 384 n.10. Field was the primary 
drafter of the California Civil Practice Act, see C. SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF TilE LAW 
54 (1963), and based that act on the New York Code which was drafted by his brother, David Dudley 
Field. See id.; W. Goedecke, Rights, Interests, and the Constitution: The Jurisprudence of Mr. Justice 
Stephen Johnson Field 59 n.2 (1958) (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Chicago); see also Pound, David 
Dudley Field: An Appraisal, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY EsSAYS &-10 (A. Reppy ed. 1949). 
140. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733. 
141. ld. at 732-33. 
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fourteenth amendment did not exist at the relevant time. 142 Finally, the 
specific due process "holding" of the case-that a judgment rendered 
without personal jurisdiction is unenforceable even in the rendering 
forum-has been viewed by at least some courts and commentators as itself 
quite novel. 143 
In some ways, the actual result in Pennoyer is a surprising one, at least 
coming from Field. Field was a vigorous defender of private property and in 
other opinions he had been far more sensitive to the problem of disturbing 
title once it has fallen to a bona fide purchaser for value. 144 The result of 
Pennoyer was to unsettle title to property. Under the facts of the case, at 
142. Most commentators have focused on the fact that the fourteenth amendment was not in 
existence at the time of the original judgment in Mitchell v. Neff See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 45, at 773 
n.20; Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative 
Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses ((pt. 1)), 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 
499,504-05 (1981). However, given Field's analysis of the fourteenth amendment, the relevant question 
is not whether the due process clause existed at the time of the original judgment, but whether it existed 
at the time of the enforcement proceeding. This is so, because, as explained infra in the text 
accompanying notes 172-174, Field does not rely on the clause as the source of the criteria for 
determining the validity of the original judgment but simply as the reason for refusing to enforce the 
judgment. Thus, the fourteenth amendment could be relied on so long as it was in existence at the time 
of the enforcement proceeding. Although the fourteenth amendment did not exist at the time of the 
sheriff's sale, it did exist at the time of Neff's ejectment action. Even focusing on the ejectment action, 
however, the discussion of the fourteenth amendment is still dictum because that proceeding was 
brought in federal court, not in state court, and the actions of a federal court would not be limited by the 
fourteenth amendment (though the due process clause of the fifth amendment might be relevant). For a 
discussion of the differences between the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, see R. CASAD, supra 
note 129, 11 5.01; Clermont, Restating TerritorialJurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 
66 CORNELL L. REv. 411, 434-36 (1981); Note, Fifth Amendment Due Process Limitations on 
Nationwide Federal Jurisdiction, 61 B. U.L. REV. 403 (1981). 
143. See, e.g., De La Montanya v. De La Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 121-22,44 P. 345,350 (1896) 
(McFarland, J., dissenting); FREEMAN ON JuDGMENTS§ 567 (3d ed. 1881); Whitten, The Constitutional 
Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith 
and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part Two), 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 735, 822-28 (1981); see also 
Note, supra note 138. Even after Pennoyer, the Supreme Court continued to express some uncertainty 
on this point. In Hart v. Sansom, 110 U.S. 151 (1884), a nonresident defendant was served by 
publication in a manner prescribed by state statute. Although the Court held that federal courts were not 
bound by the prior judgment because the defendant was not served in person within the state, the Court 
observed that "[t]he courts of the State [which rendered the judgment] might, perhaps, feel bound to 
give effect to the service made as directed by its statutes." !d. at 155. 
144. In Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350 (1874), for example, Field held that under the 
circumstances of that case, a judicial sale of property based on a judgment rendered without personal 
jurisdiction passed no title. He noted, however, that there is a well established exception where the sale 
is to a "stranger bona fide." !d. at 375 (quoting Gott v. Powell, 41 Mo. 416,420 (1867)). In Galpin, the 
sale was to one of the attorneys for the original plaintiff, not to a stranger bonafide. See also Cooper v. 
Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308, 321 (1870) (expressing concern about "unsettl[ing) titles to vast 
amounts of property"). In the somewhat different context of the Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 
(1879), Field expressed a similar concern. There, the Court upheld a federal law requiring the railroads 
to establish a sinking fund for payment of debts due the federal government. Field, dissenting, 
expressed alarm that the decision would "tend to create insecurity in the title to corporate property in the 
country." !d. at 750 (Field, J., dissenting). 
500 
Pennoyer Reconsidered 
least as presumed by the Court, Pennoyer was a bona fide purchaser for 
value who had purchased property at a sheriff's auction held pursuant.to a 
court order, paid valuable consideration to the state, and received a signed 
deed. He had then gone about his business for years, paying taxes on the 
land, selling off a portion and using the land as any landowner might. Ten 
years after the sheriff's sale, this bona fide purchaser discovered that not 
only did he not have title but he was subject to damages for trespass and 
could not even recover the taxes paid on the true owner's behalf. 
It is one thing to decide whether a judgment should be enforced, but once 
a judgment has been executed and we introduce bona fide purchasers, the 
problem becomes much more complex. 145 Oregon dealt with the problem 
of bona fide purchasers through a statutory scheme which gave the judg-
ment debtor a year after execution of the judgment to set aside the execu-
tion.I46 After a year, the debtor could not reclaim the property although he 
might be able to recover against the original plaintiff. Such a system 
preserves the rights of bona fide purchasers and the integrity and reliability 
of a sheriff's deed, while giving the original debtor some opportunity to 
undo any fraud. All of this was ignored by the Court. 
The opinion in Pennoyer is commonly explained as being based on a 
theory that state power is coextensive with physical power.I47 However, 
both the facts of Pennoyer and Field's views expressed in other cases 
concerning the limits of governmental authorityi48 suggest that he did not 
believe that state power was coextensive with physical power. Under the 
facts of the case, there can be no question that Oregon had the physical 
power to enforce the judgment-it exercised that power when the sheriff 
auctioned Neff's Oregon land. Moreover, the view that jurisdiction is 
coextensive with physical power is flatly contrary to the fundamental 
premise which Field labored much of his judicial career to establish-that 
there are limits on the power of states irrespective of the existence of 
145. As noted earlier, see supra note 52, the Supreme Court appears to have treated the case as if 
Pennoyer were a bona fide purchaser who had purchased the land directly from the sheriff at the auction. 
146. Section 57 of the Oregon Code of Civil Procedure allowed a defendant, if successful after 
reopening his default judgment, to collect restitution as ordered by the court. Nonetheless, if the 
property was sold upon execution to a purchaser in good faith, the title would remain with the purchaser, 
despite the defendant's success. 
147. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) ("[t]he foundation of jurisdiction is physical 
power"); R. CASAD, supra note 142, at 2-10. 
148. See infra notes 155-<i1 and accompanying text. 
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physical power. 149 Pennoyer, like so many of Field's decisions, ISO is not 
about the physical limitations on state power, but about constitutional 
limitations which restrict state authority notwithstanding the existence of 
physical power. ISI 
The explanation as to why Justice Field was prepared to write an 
elaborate exegesis, most of it dicta, the result of which was to unsettle title 
to real estate, seems not to lie in some theory of physical power. Rather, the 
explanation seems to lie in Field's discussion of the nonphysical limitations 
on state power. The basic premise of the opinion is that there are limitations 
on state power that are simply inherent in the nature of government. Having 
described these limitations, Field then goes on to invoke the due process 
clause as a mechanism to which the federal courts may turn to ensure that 
states do not exceed the inherent limitations on their power. !52 When the 
due process discussion of Pennoyer is viewed in the context of Field's other 
opinions, it appears not as a chance afterthought, but as the primary point 
I 49. See Bird, The Evolution of Due Process of Law in the Decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court, 13 CoLUM. L. REv. 37, 42-43 (1913). Further, Field implies in Pennoyer that consent by the 
defendant would be a basis for jurisdiction. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 729. This suggests that not only is 
physical power not a sufficient condition, it is not a necessary condition either. 
150. See, e.g .. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 690-91 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting): 
Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., III U.S. 746, 759 (1884) (Field, J., concurring); Munn v. 
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, !38 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting); Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 
139-40 (1874) (Field, J., concurring); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,83 (1873) (Field. 
1., dissenting); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 316,321-22 (1867); Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 
F. Cas. 252 (C. C. D. Cal. 1879)_ (No. 6546). 
151. As others have noted, the physical power explanation for Field's personal jurisdiction 
concepts is inadequate for another reason. The need for physical power has been explained as relating to 
concerns about the enforceability of judgments. While this may be a legitimate worry in the interna· 
tiona! context, it is not clear why it is a problem in our federal system in which states are bound under the 
full faith and credit clause to enforce the judgments of other states. See Jay. "Minimum Contacts" as a 
UnifiedTheoryofPersonal Junsdiction: A Reappraisal. 59 N.C.L. REv. 429.453 (1981); Kurland. The 
Supreme Courr. rhe Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts. 25 U. CHt. 
L. REV. 569. 585 (1958). 
152. Professor Whitten has argued that prior to Pennoyer there was a general understanding that 
territorial limits on personal jurisdiction could be altered by state legislatures. Whitten. supra note 143. 
at 800-04. Whitten cites, for example, Justice Johnson's dissent in Mills v. Duryee, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 
481 (1813), in which Johnson observed that the territorial rules of personal jurisdiction were "eternal 
principles of justice" which "never ought to be dispensed with, and which courts of justice never can 
dispense with, but when compelled by positive statute." /d. at 486 (emphasis added); accord Hol-
lingsworth v. Barbour, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 466, 472 (1830); see Whitten, supra note 143, at 801. Whitten 
concludes that "the predominant pre-fourteenth amendment view would have rejected due process as 
limiting the legislature's power to exceed the territorial rules of jurisdictions." /d. at 803-04 (emphasis 
in original). One might add of course, that those holding this predominant view would probably also 
have rejected the premise of substantive due process-that the due process clause limits substantive 
legislative power. These observations, however, simply highlight that Field's opinion in Pennoyer 




which Field wanted to establish throughout the second half of his judicial 
career. 153 
2. Due Process 
Field was the "pioneer and prophet" of the doctrine of substantive due 
process.154 His opinions during the 1870's and 1880's, largely dissents and 
concurrences, formed the foundation for the substantive due process ap-
proach later embraced in Lochner v. New York. 155 Field's view was that 
there were certain fundamental and inalienable rights. These rights were 
not created by the fourteenth amendment. Rather, the fourteenth amend-
ment provided the mechanism for protecting these rights from intrusions by 
the states.156 In Field's view, the fourteenth amendment "was intended to 
give practical effect to the declaration of 1776 of inalienable rights, rights 
which are the gift of the Creator; which the law does not confer, but only 
recognizes. "157 Field's concept of what rights were fundamental was quite 
broad 158 and he was deeply troubled by what he perceived to be a rising tide 
of socialism and a growing use of government power to alter or limit those 
fundamental private rights. 159 He became preoccupied by a desire to 
establish the limits of government power, and he viewed the fourteenth 
amendment as one of the best weapons available in that fight. His views in 
this area were entrenched,160 and though repeatedly in the minority, he 
153. Pennoyer is not the only case in which Field was willing to embark on extended discussions of 
the fourteenth amendment even where such discussions were not strictly necessary to the decision in the 
particular case. See, e.g., Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746,754 (1884) (Field, J., 
concurring); Bartemeyerv. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 13~1 (1874) (Field, J., concurring). As one 
commentator has observed about Field's propensity toward dicta: "For Field, it is not this case that is of 
crucial importance, but this class of cases, and the statement of a correct or an incorrect principle 
governing the class of cases." W. Goedecke, supra note 139, at 85-86. 
154. Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L. REv. 643, 653 
(1909); see Graham, Justic_e Field and the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 YALE L.J. 851, 853 (1943). 
155. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the 
Constitution, 41 HARv. L. REv. 121, 141 (1927). 
156. See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 690 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting). 
157. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 105 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting); see Powell v. 
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 692 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting); Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City 
Co., 111 U.S. 746,756 (1884) (Field, J., concurring); see also Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 
316, 321-22 (1867). 
158. See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 692-94 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting); Butchers' 
Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 756-58 (1884) (Field, J., concurring); Munn v. Illinois, 
94 U.S. 113, 141-44 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 
96-98 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting); see also O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 362-63 (1892) (Field, 
J., dissenting). 
159. See Graham, supra note 154, at 853-57. 
160. See id. 
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continued to write empassioned opinions setting forth his views on the 
fourteenth amendment. 161 
In the midst of Field's as yet unsuccessful battle to use the fourteenth 
amendment as a weapon limiting state power, Pennoyer v. Neff must have 
been a real bright spot. As one commentator observed, the opinion in 
Pennoyer was undoubtedly for Field a "labor of love." 162 Pennoyer appears 
to be the first case in which a state action or statute was actually invalidated 
and the fourteenth amendment was cited as a basis for such invalidation. 
Pennoyer offered an ideal vehicle for Field to set forth his approach to the 
fourteenth amendment. Factually, it appeared that an injustice had been 
done. In addition, the case did not concern the more controversial areas of 
economic and social regulation. Further, while the scope of the due process 
clause as a limit on substantive state regulation was unclear, there was 
general agreement that the due process clause had something to do with 
what procedures were required. 163 Thus, Pennoyer offered an opportune 
vehicle for Field to set forth his fourteenth amendment jurisprudence in a 
relatively noncontroversial context. Once the general approach was estab-
lished in the area of procedure, the Court could move into the more 
controversial substantive areas. 164 
Field appears to have taken full advantage of the opportunity, and his 
approach in Pennoyer parallels in several respects his approach in other 
fourteenth amendment cases. 165 First, and most basically, the focus is not 
on concerns about fairness to the particular defendant, but instead is on the 
inherent limitations on the power of governments. Early in the Pennoyer 
opinion, Field articulates what he believes to be two central and self-
161. See, e.g., Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678,687 (1888) (Field, 1., dissenting); Butchers' 
Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., Ill U.S. 746,756 (1884) (Field, J., concurring); Munn v. Illinois, 94 
U.S. 113, 136 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting); Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. I29, I40 (1874) (Field, J., 
concurring). The strength of Field's convictions in this area is demonstrated by the opinions he wrote 
while riding circuit in the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., County of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R.R., 13 F. 
Cas. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. I882); Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, I2 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6546); In 
re Ah Fong, I F. Cas. 213 (C.C.D. Cal. I874) (No. 102). These circuit opinions include broad dicta 
about the fourteenth amendment and statements which seem to be at odds with the then current position 
of the Supreme Court. See Graham, supra note 154, at 883-87. 
162. Hough, Due Process of Law-To-day, 32 HARV. L. REv. 2I8, 226 (19I9). 
163. See id; see also Bird, supra note I49, at 45; Mendelson, A Missing Link in the Evolution of 
Due Process, 10 VAND. L. REV. 125, I25-26 (1956). 
I64. As Professor Willis observed, "after the Supreme Court had made the due process clause 
apply to legislation so far as concerned matters of legal procedure, it was easy for it to extend the 
doctrine to legislation so far as concerned matters of substantive law." Willis, Due Process of Law 
Under the United States Constitution, 74 U. PA. L. REv. 331,336 (1926). 
I65. See generally Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., III U.S. 746,759 (1884) (Field, 1., 
concurring); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. I13, 140 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting); Slaughter-House Cases, 
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 316 
(1867); W. Goedecke, supra note 139, at 81. 
504 
Pennoyer Reconsidered 
evident rules about state power: "that every State possesses exclusive 
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its ter-
ritory" 166 and "that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority 
over persons or property without its territory." 167 From these premises 
Field derives his conclusion that in personam jurisdiction exists only where 
there has been service in the state. Later in the opinion, Field does note that 
his approach to personal jurisdiction is consistent with concerns about 
issuing proper notice to the defendant. 168 Nonetheless, the focus of the 
opinion is not on notice or insuring litigation fairness. 169 Instead, it is on the 
inherent limitations of government power. Given this focus, that there is no 
mention in the opinion of the plaintiff and his interests is not surprising; 
Field perceived the case as a confrontation between government power and 
the defendant-the plaintiff's interest is simply irrelevant.170 
A second interesting parallel between Pennoyer and Field's other four-
teenth amendment decisions is that in all of these cases, Field treats the 
fourteenth amendment not as the source of the rights in question, but rather 
as a device for recognizing and enforcing preexisting and inalienable 
rights.171 This purely instrumental approach to the due process clause is 
apparent both from the structure of the Pennoyer opinion and from the due 
process discussion itself. The discussion of the due process clause comes at 
the end of the opinion, after Field concluded that there was no personal 
jurisdiction and that enforcement of the judgment could be resisted on the 
basis of the full faith and credit cause. 172 Moreover, when Field does 
address the due process clause, his discussion strongly suggests that the 
due process clause is not itself the source of the personal jurisdiction 
principles. This is apparent from the last sentence of the paragraph in which 
166. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. 
167. /d. 
168. /d. at 726. 
169. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
170. This approach to the case stands in contrast to Deady's approach. As discussed earlier, Deady 
treated the case Jess as a confrontation between the government and the defendant, and more as a 
confrontation between the plaintiff and the defendant. Field, on the other hand, perceived the problem 
in Pennoyer as being a confrontation between government power and private rights. 
171. See, e.g., Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., lll U.S. 746, 756-57 (1884) (Field, J., 
concurring); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 105 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting). See 
generally Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678,690-94 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting); Munn v. Illinois, 
94 U.S. 113, 136 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting). W. Goedecke, supra note 139, at 77-78. 
172. Because Pennoyer v. Neff was in federal court, the full faith and credit clause of the 
Constitution was not involved, but the comparable provision for federal courts now embodied in 28 
u.s.c. § 1738 (1982). 
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Field discusses due process. 173 In that sentence, Field talks about both 
personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction as prerequisites to a 
valid and enforceable judgment. Subject matter jurisdiction and personal 
jurisdiction are put on the same footing in his due process analysis, yet one 
would certainly not infer that Field meant to suggest that the determination 
of whether there is subject matter jurisdiction is controlled by the due 
process clause. All that Field says in Pennoyer is that due process requires 
that a court rendering a judgment have subject matter and personal jurisdic-
tion. He does not say that the due process clause provides the criteria for 
determining whether such jurisdiction exists.174 
In Pennoyer, as in his other fourteenth amendment cases, 175 Field looks 
elsewhere for the substantive rights protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment. The result is that the rules for determining when personal jurisdiction 
exists were analyzed independent of the due process clause itself. Field 
thought the rules for determining when personal jurisdiction exists derived 
from universally accepted principles of international law and concerns 
about relations among independent states. The substance of the rules for 
personal jurisdiction have little to do with protecting defendants, but given 
that the rules exist, the defendant has the right under the due process clause 
to insist that the rules are followed. 
This basic approach in which the fourteenth amendment is used as an 
instrument for implementing preexisting rights leads to a third similarity 
between Pennoyer and Field's other fourteenth amendment opinions. It 
seems to be characteristic of Field (and probably others of his era) that he 
thought fundamental natural law rights were largely self-evident. 176 As a 
173. The paragraph on the due process clause states: 
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of 
such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the 
ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of 
parties over whom the court has no jurisdiction, do not constitute due process of law. . . . [T]here 
can be no doubt of [the meaning of those terms] when applied to judicial proceedings. They then 
mean a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles which have been 
established in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights. To 
give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution-that is, 
by the law of its creation-to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit; and, if that involves merely a 
determination of the personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction 
by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance. 
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733. 
174. See Abrams & Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the Control of State Court 
Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REv. 75, 78 n.I8 (1984); Rheinstein, supra note 138, at 791. 
175. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323,362-63 (1892) (Field, 1., dissenting); Butchers' 
Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., Ill U.S. 746, 756--57 (1884) (Field, J., concurring); Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting). 
176. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 105. See generally C. SWISHER, supra note 
139, at 426 (noting that "the content of these rights which he [Field] endeavored to protect through his 
judicial decisions was largely made up of his own ideas as to what was good in the life around him"). 
506 
Pennoyer Reconsidered 
result, he was not as rigorous as one would have liked in his analysis of the 
supposed preexisting rules of naturallaw.t77 
Field's analysis of what he thought to be the universally accepted rules of 
personal jurisdiction is similarly unsatisfying. Field asserts that it would be 
an "encroachment upon the independence" of a sister state for a forum to 
exercise jurisdiction over persons or property outside its borders." 178 Field 
never explains why one state is hurt by another state's exercise of judicial 
jurisdiction. How was California (Neff's supposed state of residence at the 
time of the original suit) hurt by Oregon's exercise of jurisdiction? Califor-
nia may be hurt when Oregon taxes people or property in California, at 
least if there is a limit on multiple taxation. It may be hurt when Oregon 
substantive laws are applied to conduct in California since that might 
encourage conduct which California considers undesirable or discourage 
conduct which it considers beneficial. It is far from clear, though, how 
California is hurt from the mere exercise of judicial jurisdiction by a sister 
state.179 Moreover, as in the Slaughter-House Cases, Field overstates the 
evidence-the "universal" principles of personal jurisdiction were not as 
universally accepted as Field thought them to be.I80 
177. The Slaughter-House Cases, for example, concerned a monopoly granted by the state of 
Louisiana to one New Orleans slaughterhouse. In the Slaughter-House Cases Field focused on the 
privilege and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment rather than the due process clause. After 
the decision in the Slaughter-House Cases, Field shifted his focus to the due process clause. Nonethe-
less, this shift did not affect the basic analysis and Field's opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases 
remains one of the classic articulations of the position which formed the foundation for substantive due 
process. Field thought it largely self-evident that such a monopoly violated fundamental law. He 
asserted early in his dissent: "No one will deny the abstract justice which lies in the position of the 
plaintiffs in error ...• " 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 86. To Field, it was unthinkable that the states could 
have the power to grant monopolies and thereby interfere with "the sacred right of labor." I d. at 106. 
Though Field did attempt to reinforce his views with some objective evidence-specifically the 
treatment of monopolies in England-Field substantially overstates the evidence. After a lengthy 
discussion, Field concurred that "[t]he common law of England. . . condemned all monopolies in any 
known trade or manufacture, and declared void all grants of-special privileges whereby others could be 
deprived of any liberty which they previously had, or be hindered in their lawful trade." I d. at 104. This 
conclusion is simply not accurate-the battles in England were not so much over whether monopolies 
could be granted but over who should grant them. See Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning 
Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 355 (1954). 
Some other examples of the universal and self-evident propositions set forth by Field were that the 
issuance of paper money violated the "universal law of currency," Julliard v. Greenman, llO U.S. 421, 
452 (1884) (Field, J., dissenting), and that all nations "possessing any degree of civilization" observed 
Sunday closing laws. Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 520 (1858) (Field, J., dissenting). 
178. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723. 
179. See Abrams & Dimond, supra note 174, at 84; Drobak, supra note 53, at 1050. 
180. See supra notes 138, 139; see also Casad, supra note 138, at 61; Ehrenzweig, supra note 132, 
at 289 n.3, 299, 308; Note, supra note 138, passim. Field thought that the jurisdictional limits on state 
taxing authority were similarly self-evident. In Case of the State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 82 U.S. 
(15 Wall.) 300, 319 (1872), he asserts: 
[P]roperty lying beyond the jurisdiction of the State is not a subject upon which her taxing power 
can be legitimately exercised. Indeed, it would seem that no adjudication should be necessary to 
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Field's lack of rigor in analyzing what he thought to be the preexisting 
rules of personal jurisdiction may not be surprising. Not only might Field 
have thought those principles to be self-evident, but the precise contours of 
these principles were not relevant to the actual case (since the in personam 
discussion was dictum). Moreover, the scope of these preexisting princi-
ples may not have been Field's primary concern. Field may have been less 
concerned about the precise contours of the rules for personal jurisdiction 
and more concerned about the framework which he offered for analyzing 
fourteenth amendment cases. 
Field's opinion in Pennoyer is not merely of historical interest. As is so 
often the case, the person who frames the issue controls the debate. So it is 
with personal jurisdiction. Field's opinion continues to influence personal 
jurisdiction doctrine today. lSI 
III. JURISDICTION TODAY 
In the one hundred plus years since Pennoyer, the Court has expanded 
significantly the jurisdictional power of states. If Pennoyer arose today, the 
court would probably decide there was personaljurisdiction. 182 Despite the 
changes, personal jurisdiction retains a doctrinal core derived from Field's 
opinion. Just as in Field's time, personal jurisdiction continues to be treated 
as a substantive due process right. 183 Similarly, modern courts continue to 
perceive personal jurisdiction as a confrontation between state power and 
establish so obvious a proposition. The power of taxation . . . is necessarily limited to subjects 
within the jurisdiction of the State. These subjects are persons, property, and business. 
181. See generally Hazard, supra note 108, at 241; Jay, supra note 151. 
182. See supra text accompanying notes 124-25. 
183. See R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE 717 n.e (4th ed. 1978); 
Rheinstein, supra note 138, at 789; Whitten, supra note 143, at 736. Classifying personal jurisdiction as 
a substantive rather than a procedural due process concept eliminates an anomaly that would otherwise 
exist. Field noted in Pennoyer that "proceedings in a court . . . [which lacks personal jurisdiction) do 
not constitute due process of law," Penn oyer, 95 U.S. at 733, but it does not necessarily follow from this 
that such proceedings violate the due process clause. A violation of the clause requires deprivation of 
life, liberty, or property. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,672 (1977); Board of Regents v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972). Specifically, it is not at all clear that a taking of life or property occurs by 
virtue of the mere assertion of jurisdiction, prior to judgment or enforcement of a judgment. See 
Rheinsten, supra note 138, at 779; Note, supra note 138, at 453-55. Nonetheless, the Court has found 
violations of the due process clause in cases before there was enforcement or even a judgment. See, e.g .• 
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodsen, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 
(1978). Moreover, in some of these cases it seems unlikely that enforcement ever would be sought 
against the complaining defendant. In World-Wide Volkswagen, for example, even if the local dealer had 
stayed in the case and the plaintiff had prevailed, one suspects that it would be the manufacturer not the 
local dealer who would ultimately pay. If personal jurisdiction is a substantive due process right, 
however, then the mere existence of a proceeding in an improper forum is itself a taking of liberty 
regardless of whether it results later in a taking of property. This further suggests that York v. Texas, 137 
U.S. 15 (1890), has at least been partially overruled. That case held that the mere entry of a judgment 
which was void for lack of personal jurisdiction is not a taking of liberty or property. 
508 
Pennoyer Reconsidered 
the defendant, with the plaintiff's interest being largely irrelevant.184 
Finally, modem courts assume, as did Field, that the proper scope of 
personal jurisdiction is closely tied to geographic boundaries. 
That personal jurisdiction is treated as a substantive due process protec-
tion has not always been recognized. Much of the recent commentary 
critical of current personal jurisdiction doctrine assumes that the only 
interest properly considered is the strictly procedural concem185 of litiga-
tion faimess.186 Certainly, however, the Court thinks there is some broader 
substantive interest at stake-some interest tied to state boundaries. 187 This 
is demonstrated by the Court's continued insistence that the defendant have 
sufficient "contacts" with the state. Thus, although it has abandoned 
Pennoyer' s inflexible requirement of actual physical presence, 188 the Court 
continues to require that the defendant have engaged in some purposeful 
activities directed at the forum or its residents.189 Moreover, the "contacts" 
requirement of the modem approach is intended as something more than 
some rough test of convenience.190 This point is vividly demonstrated by 
184. The Court has repeatedly stressed that state interest is a relevant consideration in assessing 
whether personal jurisdiction exists and has sometimes even suggested that the state's interest is 
dispositive. See, e.g., Shafferv. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,214-15 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 
235, 252 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Lewis, supra note 45. The Court has, by 
contrast, paid far less attention to the plaintiff's interest. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
185. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 417 (2d ed. 1983); Grey, 
Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, in DUE PRocESs; NOMOS XVIII 183 (J. Pennock & J. 
Chapman eds. 1977). 
186. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 45, at 771; Redish, Due Process, Federalism and Personal 
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 15 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112 (1981); Weintraub, Due Process 
Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State Courts: Time for Change, 63 OREG. L. REv. 485, 
522-27 (1984). 
187. One commentator has described the approach as "nee-territorial." McDougal, Judicial 
Jurisdiction: From a Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1, 4 (1982). 
188. See, e.g., Calderv. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 
2174 (1985); see also Clermont, supra note 142, at 445 (noting that the Court has shifted from a focus on 
physical power to "metaphorical power"). But see Shafferv. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213 (1977) (noting 
that the defendants never "set foot" in the forum). 
189. See Asahi Metallndus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1031-33 (O'Connor, J., for the 
plurality), 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (1987); Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 
(1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
190. See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 251 (restrictions on personal jurisdiction "more than a guarantee of 
immunity from inconvenient ... litigation"), quoted in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 
U.S. 286, 294 (1980); Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in 
the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 21-22 (1982); Redish, supra note 186, at 1117-18, 1137. But see 
Clermont, supra note 142, at 416; Lewis, The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of 
Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 699, 709 (1983) 
(suggesting that the minimum contacts test is a rule of thumb for estimating convenience and 
reasonableness). In International Shoe, the Court did mention an "estimate of the inconveniences" 
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the Court's recent opinion in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court in 
which the Court treated the contacts test and concerns about litigation 
fairness as distinct elements, with both necessary in order to support 
jurisdiction. I9I Second, in today's world with modern transportation and 
metropolitan areas which overlap multiple states, the contacts test with its 
emphasis on state boundaries seems a crude and inappropriate measure of 
convenience. Finally, the Court's application of the contacts requirement 
shows little concern for actual litigation convenience. The focus is on past 
rather than current contactsi92 and it is sufficient for the defendant to have 
"directed" his activities at a resident of the forum I93 or to have purposefully 
availed himself of privileges or protection of the forumi94 regardless of 
whether the defendant has ever been physically present in the forum. 
If the contacts requirement and territoriality element of personal juris-
diction have nothing to do with convenience, then what is the interest they 
are intended to protect? The Court has never offered much explanation but 
seems simply to have accepted Field's approach as largely self-evident. In 
International Shoe, for example, the Court merely asserts that the due 
process clause "does not contemplate that a state may make binding a 
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with 
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." I9s The Court, however, 
never explains why such a judgment would violate the due process clause, 
or why personal jurisdiction must be tied to state boundaries. Likewise, in 
Insurance Corporation of Ireland the Court states that "[t]he personal 
jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty 
interest." I96 Yet, the Court nowhere explains what that liberty interest is or 
why it has some connection with state boundaries. I97 
which result from distant litigation, 326 U.S. at 317, but this factor was in addition to the "minimum 
contacts" requirement. 
19 I. Justice O'Connor wrote forthe Court. The analytical portion of her opinion is divided into two 
sections. In the first section she analyzed whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum 
and concluded that it did not. 107 S. Ct. at 1029-31. In the second section she analyzed fairness 
considerations and concluded that litigation in the forum would be unfair and unreasonable. I d. at1035. 
Five Justices dissented from the section of the opinion discussing the contacts test and specifically found 
that the defendant did have sufficient contacts. I d. at 1035-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and in the 
judgment); id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). However, these five Justices 
concurred in O'Connor's analysis of the fairness considerations, and thus, although they thought that 
there were sufficient contacts to satisfy that prong of the jurisdictional test, they nonetheless concluded 
that fairness considerations defeated jurisdiction in this case. 
192. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Armstrong World Indus., 603 F. Supp. 1337, 1343 (D.D.C. 1985). 
193. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
194. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985). 
195. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
196. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,702 (1982). 
197. Moreover, the Court nowhere acknowledges the extensive case law concerning the meaning 
of "liberty" in the due process clause. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality 
& Reform, 43 I U.S. 8I6, 845-46 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699-718.reh'gdenied, 425 U.S. 
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A. Defining the Interests Protected by Personal Jurisdiction 
I. Territorial Limitations on State Power 
On a few occasions, the Supreme Court has attempted to go beyond its 
usual treatment of the personal jurisdiction rules as self-evident and to offer 
some explanation for the territorially based framework established by Pen-
noyer. Nevertheless, the explanations have been brief and inadequate. One 
explanation the Court has offered is that it is a consequence of the "territorial 
limitations on the power of the respective States." l98 In other words, juris-
diction represents an assertion of state authority and state authority is inher-
ently territorially limited. 199 This observation, however, explains nothing 
985 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916); Allgeyer v. 
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). See generally J. NoWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YoUNG, supra note 
185, at 452-61; Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to 
Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 133-39 (1978). This mere assertion of a liberty interest 
seems even more startling coming from the same Court which has in recent years taken some pains to 
narrow the scope of"liberty." See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841,2843-46 (1986); Olim v. 
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 
215 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); 
Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405 (1977). 
198. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958), quoted in World-Wide Volkswagen v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980). 
199. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 n.20 (1977); Weisburd, Territorial Authority and 
Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 377, 383 (1985). In support of this position that judicial 
jurisdiction is inherently territorially limited, Professor Weisburd has argued that there are similar 
sovereignty constraints which limit states' authority to tax nonresidents, to regulate property in other 
states, or to punish nonresidents for crimes in other states. /d. at 386-401. While it is true that state 
authority in these other areas is not unlimited, modem cases in these areas do not support the conclusion 
that the constraints on state authority stem from territorial sovereignty. 
In the tax area, although the early cases talk in terms of territorial limits of state sovereignty, see, e.g., 
Case of the State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300,319 (1872); Hays v. Pacific Mail 
S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596,598 (1854), this is no longer true. While the Court continues to require 
that there be some minimal connection between the state and the nonresident taxpayer, this requirement 
is not related to territorial sovereignty, but stems from the fact that taxes are the quid pro quo for services 
rendered by a state and thus can only be levied against those who plausibly received something from the 
state. "The simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask 
return." Asarcoinc. v. IdahoStateTaxComm'n, 458 U.S. 307,315 (1982)(quotingWisconsin v. J.C. 
Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)). As Professor Martin has observed, the modern tax cases seem to 
be more concerned with fairness than territorial power. See Martin, A Reply to Professor Kirgis, 62 
CORNELL L. REV. 151, 152 (1976); see also Redish, supra note 186, at 1135. 
The cases concerning lack of state authority to regulate property or crimes in other states are 
examples of situations in which state regulatory authority, sometimes called legislative jurisdiction, is 
limited. At the outset, it should be noted that the Court has generally allowed a state very broad 
authority to apply its laws to situations largely unconnected to that state. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). Moreover, as in the tax cases, to the extent the Court has limited states' 
legislative jurisdiction it has generally not relied on notions of territorial sovereignty, but has instead 
focused on concerns about fairness. See W. RICHMAN & W. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF 
LAws 244, 246 (1984). In particular, the Court has focused on the expectations of the parties at the time 
of the conduct in question. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2980-81 (1985); 
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about personal jurisdiction. Of course, the authority of states is in some sense 
limited territorially. Unless this is an attempt to revive Field's discredited 
notion that states can only "directly" affect things located within the state, zoo 
however, this observation is quite unhelpful. One could argue that as long as a 
state court is physically located within the state which established it and does 
not roam around the country looking for disputes but instead only resolves 
Redish, supra note 186, at1134. The two specific areas which Weisburd discusses provide, at best, weak 
support for his position. As to the local action rule, while there is authority that seems to treat the rule as 
a jurisdictional matter linked to state territorial sovereignty, there are other cases which treat the rule as 
a matter of venue, not jurisdictional power. See Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Copeland, 398 F.2d 364, 
367 n.5 (4th Cir. 1968) (noting there is disagreement about whether local action rule is a matter of 
jurisdiction or venue); J. fRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 87 (1985). Compare 
Eddington v. Texas & New Orleans R.R., 83 F. Supp. 230 (S.D. Tex. 1949) (local action rule is a matter 
of venue), with Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 735 F.2d 1517, 1521-22 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985) (local action rule is a matter of jurisdiction). Moreover, 
as Professor Currie has observed, the local action rule seems to be largely grounded in English history 
and the forms of common law; Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 
HARV. L. REv. 36, 67-72 (1959); see Wicker, The Development of the Distinction Between Local and 
Transitory Actions, 4 TENN. L. REv. 55 (1925). Moreover, the rule itself has been criticized. See, e.g., 
W. Richman & W. Reynolds, supra, at 100-01, 218-20. In the criminal area, it is true that under the 
traditional common law approach, a state could assert criminal jurisdiction only if the gravamen of the 
offense occurred within the territorial boundaries of the forum. See Comment, Jurisdiction Over Felony 
Murder, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1431, 1434 (1983). However, not only has strict territoriality eroded over the 
years, see generally L. BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUcriON TO JURISDICTION 324-26 (1986), there is 
relatively little authority on the extent to which a territorial approach is constitutionally mandated. See 
Rotenberg, Extraterritorial Legislative Jurisdiction and the State Criminal Law, 38 TEX. L. REV. 763, 
773-81 (1960). Moreover, any constitutional limits that do exist may reflect, at least in part, venue and 
vicinage requirements imposed by the sixth amendment, see generally L. BRILMAYER, supra, at 
329-35, or concerns about subjecting conductio conflicting criminal standards, see Nielson v. Oregon, 
212 U.S. 315, 321 (1909), rather than concerns about the inherent territoriality of state power. 
Finally, the antisuit injunction cases seem to have little to do with territorial sovereignty. As Weisburd 
himself notes, injunctions against suits in other states are not considered void, Weisburd, supra, at391 
n.62, and thus they do not support the broad proposition that state courts lack jurisdiction to issue orders 
the legal consequences of which are "felt exclusively outside the forum state." /d. at 391. As Professor 
Reese has explained, the reason why antisuit injunctions are not subject to the full faith and credit clause 
is that they are "thought to be a situation where the national policy of full faith and credit should bow 
before the obvious interest of an individual state in being permitted . . . to control the actions of its own 
courts." Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 IowA L. REv. 183, 198 (1957); see 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF CONFLICTS§ 103 comment b (1971). Thus, antisuit injunctions involve 
issues of comity and the relations between coequal sovereigns rather than issues of power. 
200. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 722; see Hazard, supra 108, at 264. 
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questions that have been brought before it by a plaintiff, then it has fully 
complied with the territorial limitation on its authority to adjudicate. 2qi 
2. Federalism 
The Court has also explained the prominence of territoriality in modern 
personal jurisdiction theory as having something to do with federalism, that 
is, with the protection of states from other states. As the Court explained in 
World-Wide Volkswagen, the due process clause "acting as an instrument of 
interstate federalism" may divest a state of jurisdiction even where there is no 
unfairness to the defendant. 202 This explanation seems to deriye from Field's 
mention of international law and concerns about relations among states. 203 
Nonetheless, the Court's federalism theory seems to be a misapplication of 
Field's opinion. Field's discussion of international law was simply part of his 
analysis of what he saw as the inherent limitation on state power. 204 But Field 
understood as well as anyone that due process was a protection for individu-
als, not a protection for states. His opinions on the fourteenth amendment 
vividly demonstrate that he believed that provision to be a major limitation 
on the power of states to affect the rights of individuals. 205 Nowhere in his 
fourteenth amendment opinions does Field express concern about protecting 
states from other states; his sole concern was to protect private rights from 
usurpation by the states.206 Most importantly, regardless of whether the 
201. Some commentators have argued that judicial jurisdiction is proper only if the conduct 
involved has a sufficient connection with the forum that the forum could properly regulate that conduct. 
See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. 
Cr. REV. 77; Weisburd, supra note 199, at 404-05. This assumes, however, that the scope of judicial 
jurisdiction should be no more extensive than legislative jurisdiction. It is not obvious why this should 
be so. See Twerski, On Territoriality and Sovereignty: System Shock and Constitutional Choice of Law, 
10 HoFSTRA L. REv. 149, 151 n.7 (1981), and authorities cited therein. Overly expansive legislative 
jurisdiction is not only more intrusive into the sovereignty of other jurisdictions, it presents the potential 
for subjecting people to inconsistent legal standards. For example, it would be unacceptable for the 
State of Nevada to legislate the speed limit in California. Judicial jurisdiction does not present these 
problems (or at least not to the same degree). 
202. 444 u.s. 286, 294 (1980). 
203. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722-23; Redish, supra note 191, at 1116. 
204. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text. 
205. See supra cases cited in note 153. 
206. Further, for all the talk in Pennoyer about sovereignty of states, that is surely not what the case 
is about, because the result of the case is in fact a major intrusion into state sovereignty. The issue in 
Pennoyer was not whether the prior judgment could be enforced. The issue was whether the federal 
court would evict a holder of a title issued pursuant to a sheriff's auction held pursuant to an Oregon 
judgment. The federal court in Pennoyer v. Neff did not merely decline to enforce a judgment, it 
affirmatively undid the prior action of the Oregon state court. This is hardly a step which preserves state 
sovereignty. 
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federalism explanation is consistent with Field's opinion, it simply makes no 
sense to turn the fourteenth amendment from a provision protecting citizens 
from states into a provision protecting states from other states. As others have 
amply demonstrated, contrary to the Court's assertion in World-Wide Vol-
kswagen, the due process clause is surely not "an instrument of interstate 
federalism. " 207 
3. Individual Liberty Interests 
More recently, the Court has itself acknowledged that the federalism 
explanation is inconsistent with its theory that the principle of personal 
207. 444 U.S. at 294; see, e.g., Lewis, supra note 45, at 809-12; Redish, supra note 186, at 
1113-14, 1129,1132. 
Professor Brilmayer has offered a variation of a federalism argument to explain why it is constitu-
tionally necessary that defendants be able to control where they are subject to suit. She argues that 
unless we require purposeful contacts by the defendant with the forum, states could improperly impose 
costs on nonresident consumers because defendants who could not structure their conduct to avoid high 
cost states would have to raise their prices to everyone to cover the potential cost. Brilmayer, supra note 
20 I, at 94-96. This explanation is not adequate for several reasons. First, it is important to recognize 
that the costs at issue are not the costs of litigation or the amount of any liability judgment-they are 
only the difference in cost in litigating in one place rather than another. Thus, the scale of the costs 
involved is relatively small. Second, even requiring purposeful contacts, states can still impose costs on 
nonresidents. Brilmayer assumes that if defendants can structure their conduct to avoid high cost 
jurisdictions they can and will either decline to deal with that jurisdiction or will deal with residents of 
that jurisdiction only at a higher price which reflects the higher cost of potential litigation there. This 
assumes that price discrimination is possible, an assumption that is not always warranted. Suppose the 
National Enquirer were to decide that California is a high cost jurisdiction in which to litigate. It could 
stop selling newspapers in California or it could charge a higher price in California. The National 
Enquirer might also choose, however, a third course which is to charge a higher price nationwide. It 
might take this third course if it were not practically or economically feasible to charge a different price 
in California. Thus, even under a system which requires purposeful contacts, people in Florida may pay 
more for the National Enquirer simply because California is an expensive place to litigate. Finally, 
Brilmayer analyzes the economic implications of imposing those costs on the defendant, but does not 
considerthe implications of imposing those costs on the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is in Oklahoma and the 
defendant is in New York, then one of them will have to bear the cost of distant litigation. If the 
jurisdictional rules force the plaintiff to litigate in New York, then it is the plaintiff who is forced to bear 
these costs. New York could permit successful plaintiffs to recover the expenses associated with 
litigating in that more distant forum, but New York has no incentive to impose such a cost shifting rule 
because the absence of such a rule is a way to lower the costs of its local businesses at the expense of 
people who live in other states. See Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evollllionary Process: The Developmem of 
Quasi In Rem and In Personam Principles. 1978 DUKE L.J. 1147, 1185-86. 
One might respond, of course, that the plaintiff knowingly bought the product and that this justifies a 
general rule that plaintiffs must assume the cost of distant litigation. Thus, when someone buys a 
product from a New York firm, he knows that the true cost of that product is the cash price, plus the cost 
of litigating in New York times the likelihood of such litigation. Having calculated the true price, our 
knowledgeable buyer may conclude that New York products are too expensive and buy fewer of them. 
Thus, New York pays the price for its refusal to have a cost shifting rule. For this analysis to work. 
however, we must assume that the buyer is in a position to know where each product has come from and 
thus to properly calculate its true cost. Buyers may not have this information, and even if they did, it 
might be so time-consuming to make these individual calculations, that it is more efficient for buyers to 
spread this risk over all purchases from all states. 
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jurisdiction emanates from the due process clause. 2os The due process 
clause protects individual rights, not states' rights. This recog11:ition, 
though, has not eliminated the territoriality element. 209 Now the Court 
merely asserts that the territoriality element is necessary in order to protect 
citizens. The shift still does not explain why boundaries should matter; it in 
fact presents the problem more boldly. If the due process clause protects 
litigants, then before one can define and rationalize the appropriate test, 
one must first determine what it is one is protecting litigants from. That the 
Court has never asked this question, let alone attempted to answer it, may 
be the strongest testament to the grip which Pennoyer holds on us. 
In some of its recent cases, the Court has stressed that the reason for 
requiring contacts with the forum is to give defendants "fair warning" 
about what conduct will subject them to jurisdiction210 and allow them to 
"structure their primary conduct" to control where they will be subject to 
jurisdiction. 211 This does not, however, explain why boundaries matter or, 
to put it differently, why defendants have a constitutional right to know and 
be able to control whether they will be subject to jurisdiction in any given 
state. We could have a strict liability personal jurisdictions system in which 
defendants could be sued wherever their conduct caused injury. In substan-
tive tort law, strict liability is clearly consti~utional. If a defendant engaged 
in certain activities can be liable whenever injury occurs, why can't that 
defendant be subject to suit wherever injury occurs?212 
Although the Court has apparently thought it obvious that subjecting a 
defendant to jurisdiction in a state as to which the defendant has no contacts 
is a taking of "liberty," I must admit that I do not find this quite so clear. It 
is true, of course, that the Court has in a variety of contexts construed very 
broadly the word "liberty" as it is used in the due process clause,m but the 
208. Insurance Corp. oflreland v. Compagnie des Bauxete de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 
(1982). 
209. The Court continues to stress the importance of the defendant having purposeful contacts with 
the forum. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174,2181-82 (1985); Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984). 
210. Burger King Corp., 105 S. Ct. at 2182 (quoting Shafferv. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) 
(Stevens, J., concurring)). 
211. /d. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). 
212. Professor Brilmayer in her article on personal jurisdiction raised this analogy betweeen 
substantive strict liability and personal jurisdiction. Brilmayer, supra note 201, at 94-95. She con-
cluded that although it is constitutional as a matter of substantive law to hold people strictly liable for 
certain conduct, strict liability personal jurisdiction is not constitutional. For a discussion of her 
rationale, see supra note 207. 
213. A classic description of the scope ofliberty is that given in Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
399 (1923), quoted in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972): 
[Liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to 
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to 
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own 
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Court has also noted that the range of interests protected by that clause "is 
not infinite. " 214 The right to be free from litigation in a state to which one 
has not purposefully connected oneself does not seem to be one of those 
obvious fundamental rights "valued by sensible men. " 21 5 Moreover, this 
supposed liberty interest seems different from other constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interests. A defendant in civil litigation remains free to go 
about all aspects of her life as she chooses. Admittedly, litigation can be an 
inconvenience in that defendants are subject to discovery and certain other 
compulsory processes,216 but these burdens are the result of the fact of 
litigation and have nothing to do with the place of the litigation. Moreover, 
the location of litigation does not make that litigation unfair or arbitrary, 217 
provided that the proceeding is not so distant that the defendant is unable to 
attend or prepare a defense. 21s 
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 
See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,545-46 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Roe v. Wade. 410 
U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
214. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); see also cases cited supra in note 197. 
215. Monaghan, supra note 197, at 409. Recently, in Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986), 
the Supreme Court enumerated three purposes served by the due process clause. According to Justice 
Rehnquist, that clause "was 'intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers 
of government,"' id. at 665 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884)), promotes 
fairness in the decision-making process, 106 S. Ct. at 665, and "serves to prevent governmental power 
from being used for purposes of oppression.'" /d. (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & 
Improvement Co .• 59 U.S. (16 How.) 272, 277 ( 1856)). Though personal jurisdiction has nothing to do 
with decisional fairness nor with concerns about preventing government power from being used for 
purposes of oppression, one might argue that it is an "arbitrary exercise of the powers of government" 
for a state to take jurisdiction of a case where the defendant has not purposefully connected himself with 
the state. However, the cases in which the Supreme Court has found in personam jurisdiction can hardly 
be characterized as arbitrary attempts by those states to exercise power. There was nothing arbitrary in 
Delaware's attempt to take jurisdiction over the directors of a Delaware corporation, see Shaffer v. 
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), or California's attempt in a child support case to get jurisdiction over the 
father where the children were residing in California, see Kulka v. Superior Court. 436 U.S. 74 ( 1978). 
or Oklahoma's attempt to get jurisdiction over the seller of a car which blew up in Oklahoma, see World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In none of these cases was the state acting in 
a capricious way. In all of these cases there were plausible reasons for the exercise of governmental 
authority. 
216. See. e.g .. FED. R. Civ. P. II. 37; see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965. 
2973 (1985) (discussing the "burdens" to which defendants are subject). 
217. Professor Van Alystne has argued that there is a liberty interest in "freedom from arbitrary 
adjudicative procedures." Van Alystne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicath·e Due Process in 
the Administrative State. 62 CoRNELL L. REv. 445, 487 (1977). The place of the litigation, however. 
does not seem to make that litigation "arbitrary," at least as Van Alystne uses that word. He defines 
arbitrary procedures as ones that are "fundamentally unfair, biased, arbitrary, summary, peremptory, 
ex parte means that without justification create an intolerable margin of probable error or prejudice." 
/d. at 488. 
218. See Redish, supra note 186, at 1113-14. Professor Redish argues that the test for jurisdiction 
should be whether the parties will suffer meaningful inconvenience. /d. at 1138. 
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Though the Court has not seen fit since Pennoyer to offer much analysis 
of the interests protected by personal jurisdiction, a few commentators have 
suggested that the liberty interest protected by due process is "the defen-
dant's interest in freedom from an unrelated sovereign. "219 This explana-
tion seems to derive at least in part from a social contract theory of 
government, 22o and appears to be based on the idea that one ought not be 
subject to a judicial system which one did not choose and as to which one 
has no political input. 221 One might elaborate further and note that even 
today, states retain an importance beyond merely being political subunits. 
States are to some extent mechanisms "for recognition of social and 
cultural group differences"222 and people identify with their own states and 
feel like outsiders in other states. This justification for the territorial 
component of personal jurisdiction is not without its appeal, at least in the 
context of individuals and their personal affairs though it is somewhat less 
persuasive in a commercial context. 223 Moreover to the extent personal 
jurisdiction is based on concerns about bias and prejudice, those concerns 
can be met largely through diversity jurisdiction and removal to the federal 
courts. 224 Further, while it may be that some people feel like outsiders in a 
particular state and wish they didn't have to litigate there, a question 
remains: What gives them a constitutional right not to litigate there? As 
Professor Redish has observed, "[U]nder our constitutional system, the 
inquiry is not why should a state be allowed to take an action, but why 
shouldn't a state be allowed to do so. " 225 Finally, if one accepts that there is 
a constitutionally protected liberty interest, plaintiffs as well as defendants 
should have such an interest. 226 Why should the plaintiff be forced to resort 
to the courts of some other state to vindicate her rights? Plaintiffs, like 
219. Drobak, supra note 53, at 1047. 
220. See J. LocKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 119 (P. Laslett ed. 1960). 
221. See Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Couns, 66 MICH. 
L. REv. 227, 237 (1967); Redish, supra note 186, at 1125; Weisburd, supra note 199, at 378,416 n.l26. 
The Court has never relied on this rationale as an explanation for its approach to judicial jurisdiction. 
See Redish, supra note 186, at 1125. Nor has it used this as the justification for the limitations which 
exist on state authority to tax nonresidents or to apply its laws to nonresidents. See supra note 199. 
222. Hunter, Federalism and State Taxation of Multistate Enterprises, 32 EMORY L.J. 89, 130 
(1983). 
223. See Jay, supra note 151, at 446. 
224. See Redish, supra note 186, at 1139. 
225. /d. at 1134 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
226. See Brilmayer, supra note 201, at 89; Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEx. L. 
REv. 579, 610-11 (1984); Lewis, supra note 45, at 810; Lewis, A Brave New World for Personal 
Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1, 26 (1984); McDougal, 
supra note 187, at 9. 
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defendants, are subject to sanctions227 and the compulsory processes228 of 
the court; they may be forced to defend against counterclaims--even 
counterclaims unrelated to the original claim.229 No one likes to be an 
outsider in a strange place, but it is not clear why the Constitution should 
protect defendants but not plaintiffs from this unhappy situation. 230 
B. The Future of Personal Jurisdiction 
In recent years, there have been occasional hints that the Court might be 
moving toward a reconsideration of some enduring elements of Pennoyer. 
On closer examination, however, the Court seems to be doing more 
tinkering than a fundamental reassessment. For example, in Insurance 
Corporation of Ireland, the Court acknowledged that personal jurisdiction 
protects an individual liberty interest, not the sovereignty of states.23 1 
Some, including Justice Powell, thought this foretold the elimination of the 
minimum contacts requirement. 232 However, in subsequent cases the Court 
has continued to emphasize that a purposeful "contact" with the forum is 
still required, even if that contact need not be physical. 233 Similarly, the 
Court has suggested that it might begin moving away from its treatment of 
personal jurisdiction as a confrontation between the government and one 
227. See, e.g .. FED. R. CIV. P. II; OHIO R. Clv. P. II; I MICH. STAT. ANN. RULE 2.114. 
228. See, e.g., FED. R. Clv. P. 37; OHIO R. Clv. P. 37; I MICH. STAT. ANN. RULE 2.313. 
229. See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 68-69 (1938); Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Joseph 
Freeman, Inc., 75 F.2d 472, 472-73 (2d Cir.), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Chandler & Price Co. v. 
Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 296 U.S. 53 (1935); Mayer v. Development Corp. of Am., 396 F. Supp. 917, 
933 (D. Del. 1975); G & M Tire Corp. v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 36 F.R.D. 440,441 (N.D. Miss. 
1964). See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1416, 1424 
(1969). 
230. Professor Weisburd has asserted that it is not appropriate to consider the interest of the 
plaintiff in assessing the proper reach of personal jurisdiction. Weisburd, supra note 199, at423-27. He 
argues that a court's failure to take jurisdiction does not deprive the plaintiff of any property interest 
because the court's failure to take the case does not affect the plaintiff's substantive claim. /d. at 423. 
There are several responses that can be made to this. First, this argument can be turned on its head and 
the same said of defendants: that is, the court's accepting jurisdiction does not offend any property right 
of the defendant because the mere accepting of jurisdiction does not affect the defendant's substantive 
defenses. Second, the Supreme Court has recently acknowledged that a plaintiff does have a property 
interest in his claim and the denial of a forum to adjudicate that claim can violate due process. See Logan 
v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428-29 (1982); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 
S. Ct. 2965, 2973 (1985). Finally, if defendants have some "liberty interest" which is affected by the 
place of litigation, why is the same not true of plaintiffs? 
231. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). 
232. /d. at 713 (Powell, J., concurring); see Burstein v. State Bar, 693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982). 
233. See, e.g .. Calderv. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 
2174 (1985);seealso Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1031 (O'Connor, J., for 
the plurality), 1036 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (1987) (although the Court 
was split on the application of this standard to the facts of the particular case, there was no disagreement 
that knowing "contacts" were necessary). 
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party and instead try to accommodate the interests of both parties. In 
Burger King, the Court stated that a relevant factor in assessing jurisdiction 
is "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief," and 
even indicated that where this or other considerations were particularly 
compelling, it might require "a lesser showing of minimum contacts than 
would otherwise be required. " 234 Nonetheless, the threshold inquiry re-
mains whether the defendant "purposefully established minimum contacts 
within the forum. "235 Thus, the primary focus continues to be the rela-
tionship between the forum and one party (the defendant), not a balancing 
of the respective rights of the two parties. 236 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Pennoyer is in many ways an extraordinary case. As the facts and Judge 
Deady's opinion demonstrate, this case would have been an excellent 
vehicle for a more narrowly focused Supreme Court opinion dealing with 
the problem of notice. Justice Field,-however, elected to write an opinion 
that went far beyond the actual case before him, but that conformed to his 
natural law philosophy and his views on substantive due process. Iron-
ically, personal jurisdiction doctrine seems to be the longest surviving 
remnant of Field's approach to the fourteenth amendment. In the area of 
state economic regulation, the Court has largely rejected substantive due 
process, and even in those areas in which the doctrine retains vitality, the 
court has become increasingly circumspect in its delineation of the scope of 
the liberty interests protected by substantive due process. 237 By contrast, in 
the area of personal jurisdiction, although the test applied by the Court has 
234. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at2184;seea/soAsahiMetallndus. Co. v. SuperiorCourt,I07 S. Ct. 
1026, 1034 (1987) (noting that the plaintiff had little interest in litigating the case in the forum). 
235. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2184. Recently, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 
2965, 2975 (1985), the Court acknowledged that the fourteenth amendment protects persons, not 
merely defendants. In that case the issue was whether a state court had personal jurisdiction over 
unnamed plaintiff class members with no connection with the state. The Court held that the state did 
have personal jurisdiction over all the plaintiff class members and explained that "a forum State may 
exercise jurisdiction over the claim of an absent class-action plaintiff, even though that plaintiff may not 
possess the minimum contacts with the forum which would support personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant." /d. at 2975. 
236. This approach contrasts with the approach in other areas of procedural due process in which 
the Court has recognized that the rights of the defendant are not absolute and that some balance must be 
struck between the rights of the defendant and the rights of the plaintiff. For example, in the area of 
notice, the Court has indicated that extraordinary measures need not be taken, even though the result 
may be that the defendant never learns of the suit against him. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Likewise, the Court has appeared to move toward a balancing of plaintiffs' 
and defendants' interests in the area of prejudgment attachment. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 
U.S. 600 (1974); Leubsdorf, supra note 226, at 610-11. 
237. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text. 
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changed over the years, the doctrinal underpinning of territorial power, 
articulated in dicta 100 years ago, remains largely intact and unquestioned. 
Justice Field would surely be pleased. 
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